Comparative analysis of the use of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) in the procurement of US defense articles by the Philippine Government for the use of the armed forces of the Philippines by De Vera, Remegio M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2004-06
Comparative analysis of the use of Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) in
the procurement of US defense articles by the
Philippine Government for the use of the armed
forces of the Philippines
De Vera, Remegio M.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF FOREIGN 
MILITARY SALES (FMS) AND DIRECT COMMERCIAL 
SALES (DCS) IN THE PROCUREMENT OF US DEFENSE 
ARTICLES BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT FOR 









 Thesis Advisor:   Richard Doyle 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2004 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Comparative Analysis of the Use of Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) in the Procurement of US Defense 
Articles by the Philippine Government for the Use of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines 
6. AUTHOR(S) Remegio M. de Vera 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The Philippine government may use two methods to procure defense articles from the United States, 
either Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). This thesis examined the differences 
between FMS and DCS as methods of procurement used by the Philippine government in the acquisition of U.S. 
defense articles. The study identified the processes involved in using each of the two methods as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of each when used within the socioeconomic and political environment of the 
Philippines. Issues and considerations that influence selection decision are also discussed. DCS may offer the 
lowest fixed price, timely/earlier delivery, easier countertrade arrangements, and penalty for non-compliance to the 
provisions of the contract. FMS is preferable because it is a government-to-government sale, provides 
opportunities for Philippine military training in the United States and enhances interoperability among coalition 
forces. In addition, FMS allows for financing of defense articles from the U.S. using Foreign Military Financing, 
thus conserving Philippine government funds.  
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
105 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, Security Assistance, Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
(FMS) AND DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES (DCS) IN THE PROCUREMENT 
OF US DEFENSE ARTICLES BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT FOR THE 
USE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 
Remegio M. de Vera 
Lieutenant Colonel, Philippine Army 
B.S., Philippine Military Academy, 1981 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
 








Author:  Remegio M. De Vera 
 
 
Approved by:  Professor Richard Doyle 
 Thesis Advisor  
 
 
 Jeffrey Cuskey  
 Associate Advisor 
 
 
   Douglas A. Brook 































The Philippine government may use two methods to procure defense articles from 
the United States, either Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales 
(DCS). This thesis examined the differences between FMS and DCS as methods of 
procurement used by the Philippine government in the acquisition of U.S. defense 
articles. The study identified the processes involved in using each of the two methods as 
well as the advantages and disadvantages of each when used within the socioeconomic 
and political environment of the Philippines. Issues and considerations that influence 
selection decision are also discussed. DCS may offer the lowest fixed price, timely/earlier 
delivery, easier countertrade arrangements, and penalty for non-compliance to the 
provisions of the contract. FMS is preferable because it is a government-to-government 
sale, provides opportunities for Philippine military training in the United States and 
enhances interoperability among coalition forces. In addition, FMS allows for financing 
of defense articles from the U.S. using Foreign Military Financing, thus conserving 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii





A. PROBLEM .......................................................................................................1 
B. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
C. OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................2 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS........................................................................3 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................................3 
1. Primary Question.................................................................................3 
2. Subsidiary Questions ...........................................................................3 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ......................................................................3 
G. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4 
H.  SUMMARY ......................................................................................................5 
II. BACKGROUND TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE....................................................7 
A. U.S. ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES.............................................................7 
B.  SUMMARY ....................................................................................................12 
III. HISTORY OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES..........15 
A.  PRE-WORLD WAR II SECURITY ASSISTANCE..................................15 
B.  POST-WORLD WAR II SECURITY ASSISTANCE................................15 
C.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM....................20 
D.  SUMMARY ....................................................................................................21 
IV. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON FMS AND DCS ......................................23 
A. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ...................................................................23 
1. Definition ............................................................................................23 
2. Basic Policies.......................................................................................23 
a. Eligibility .................................................................................23 
b. FMS Authorization Acts .........................................................24 
c. Appropriations Acts ................................................................25 
B. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROCESS AND PROCEDURES..........25 
1. Definition of Requirements/Initiation..............................................25 
2. Letter of Request (LOR) – Channels of Submission.......................26 
3. Price and Availability (P&A) Data...................................................28 
4. The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) ....................................29 
a. Defined Order Case.................................................................29 
b. Blanket Order Case.................................................................30 
c. Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement.............30 
5. Compilation of LOA Data.................................................................30 
6. Preparation of the Final LOA...........................................................33 
7. Final Review of LOA .........................................................................33 
a. DSCA Countersignature .........................................................33 
b. Other DSCA Coordination Actions ........................................34 
8. Acceptance of Offer by Purchaser....................................................34 
 viii
9. FMS Pricing........................................................................................34 
10. Implementation of the Case ..............................................................36 
11. FMS Case Closure..............................................................................37 
C. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES LICENSED UNDER THE AECA....38 
1. Definition ............................................................................................38 
2. Basic Policies and Procedures...........................................................38 
D. OFFSETS IN FMS AND DCS ......................................................................38 
E. FUNDING FOR FMS AND DCS .................................................................42 
F. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................43 
V. SIGNIFICANT FACTORS AFFECTING RP IN SELECTING METHOD 
OF PROCUREMENT ...............................................................................................45 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................45 
B.  MAJOR FACTORS CONSIDERED IN SELECTING METHOD OF 
PROCUREMENT..........................................................................................45 
1. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Equipment 
Acquisition Process ............................................................................45 
2.  Request for Foreign Military Sales ..................................................47 
3.  Existing Philippine Laws Governing Procurement of Defense 
Articles from Foreign Countries.......................................................48 
4. Economic Factors...............................................................................50 
5. Political Factors..................................................................................54 
6. Contract Administration...................................................................57 
7. Defense Factors ..................................................................................58 
C. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................59 
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN FMS AND DCS ................................61 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................61 
B. ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS.............................................................61 
1. Financing ............................................................................................61 
2. Pricing .................................................................................................62 
3. Flexibility in Contracting and Offsets..............................................63 
4. Buyer’s Capability to Negotiate a Direct Contract.........................64 
5. Buyer’s Desire for U.S. Military Personnel Involvement...............65 
6. Logistics and Training.......................................................................66 
7. Procurement Lead Time/Delivery Schedule....................................67 
C.  SUMMARY ....................................................................................................68 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................69 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................69 
B. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................69 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................70 
D. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS...................70 
1. Primary Research Question..............................................................70 
2. First Subsidiary Question .................................................................71 
3. Second Subsidiary Question..............................................................72 
4. Third Subsidiary Question................................................................72 
 ix
5. Fourth Subsidiary Question..............................................................73 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.......................................................73 
APPENDIX.  POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF FMS AND DCS...................................75 
A. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ...................................................................75 
B. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES ..............................................................76 
C. COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS OF FMS OR COMMERCIAL 
SALES.............................................................................................................77 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................81 



































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 xi




Figure 1. Major Security Assistance Authorization Acts since 1954. (From: DISAM 
Online Green Book, 2003)...............................................................................24 
Figure 2. Basic Process Followed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Prior to 
Preparation of Letter of Request (LOR). (From: Briefing Presentation of 
MGen. Castellano, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, AFP at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2003) ........................26 
Figure 3. Channels of Request for FMS. (From: DISAM Online Green Book, 2003) ...28 
Figure 4. Department of the Navy Functional Organization for Security Assistance. 
(From: DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).....................................................31 
Figure 5. Department of the Army Functional Organization for Security Assistance. 
(From: DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).....................................................32 
Figure 6. U.S. Air Force Functional Organization for Security Assistance. (From: 
DISAM Online Green Book, 2003) .................................................................33 
Figure 7. FMS Pricing Formula. (From: DISAM Green Book, 2003)............................36 
Figure 8. Case Closure. (From: Briefing Presentation of MGen. Castellano, Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Logistics, AFP at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, December 2003) ...........................................................37 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii




Table 1. U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, From Woodrow Wilson to George Bush, Jr. 
(From: (Gultekin, 1998) and (“DSCA forms War Room,” 2004). ..................11 
Table 2. Countertrade Level of Commitment Required from the Supplier for the 
Purchase of Defense Equipment. (From: Venturanza, Briefing Slides, 
2004) ................................................................................................................49 
Table 3. Economic Performance of the Philippines in Terms of GDP from 1997 to 
2001 (From: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
www.janes.com. Accessed May 20, 2004) ......................................................50 
Table 4. Foreign Military Sales to the Philippines from 1991 to 2003. (From: 































I would like to express my thanks to the personnel of the Dudley Knox Library 
for their patience in providing me the techniques in doing research related to my thesis. I 
am grateful to my primary thesis advisor, Professor Richard Doyle and my associate 
thesis advisor, Professor Jeffrey R Cuskey, for all their advice, helpful suggestions and 
guidance made in the preparation of this thesis. 
I would also like to thank Major General Castillano AFP, Captain Edgar F. 
Quinsay PN and Cdr Nestor Calon of OJ4, GHQ, Col Chito Trinidad, Cdr Montanez and 
Jakki Bejosa of the AFP Modernization Program Management Office, Major Araus 
Musico PAF, Col Austria, LTC Depakakibo and Major Leo Caranto of OG4, PA, Ms 
Denisse Venturanza of PITC, Nita Maniego and other individuals who directly and 
indirectly provided me the much-needed information for my thesis. 
To my wife and children for their sacrifices, assistance, and encouragement, and 
who are my sources of inspiration in the preparation of this thesis, my profuse thanks. 
Most of all, my praises and thanks to our Lord Almighty for the many blessings 






























The Philippine’s defense industrial base alone cannot support the defense needs of 
its Armed Forces to enable it to perform fully its constitutional mandate of upholding the 
sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic. Production of these defense 
goods and services within the country would be very costly if not nearly impossible. As a 
result, acquisition of its needed defense articles must be sourced from foreign countries, 
especially from the United States. Historically, the U.S. has been the major source of 
arms and equipment for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), mostly through 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Beginning in 1996, a modest capital outlay has been 
programmed for AFP modernization, signaling the start of a substantial level of 
acquisition of the priority defense articles identified by the AFP leadership. The 
Philippine government intends to get the best value from the funds allocated for this 
purpose.  
There are two methods by which the Philippine government can acquire defense 
articles from the United States: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales 
(DCS). The decision whether to choose either FMS or DCS will remain a predicament for 
the Philippine government. It may be influenced by existing laws, policies and 
regulations, as well as the socio-economic and political environment prevailing in the 
country. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program has its legal basis in 
Republic Act No. 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Law, approved by 
the President of the Philippines on February 23, 1995. The law declares it a policy of the 
state to modernize the AFP to a level where it can perform its constitutional mandate of 
upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic fully and 
effectively (AFP Modernization Program Primer, 1998).  
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The development of AFP defense capability had been considerably impaired by 
the lack of necessary funds to procure arms and equipment. This was further aggravated 
when U.S. security assistance to the Philippines, which supplements the AFP’s defense 
budget, was discontinued as a result of the termination of the Military Bases Agreement 
in 1991.  
Strong bilateral relations were restored in 1999, and in 2003 the Philippines was 
designated by President Bush as a major non-NATO ally. That designation resulted in 
U.S. pledges of funding for a broad range of requirements intended to bolster the AFP’s 
defense capability to address its internal and external threats. The United States also 
promised a “comprehensive security review” to assess how best the United States can 
“support Philippine military modernization and reform” (“AFP Procurement Detail,” 
2003, p. 1).  
The AFP Modernization Law provided for a program capital outlay of 331.6 
billion pesos, broken down into two sub-programs. Sub-program 1, the priority program, 
with a budget of 164 billion pesos, will be funded from appropriations to include projects 
essential in developing the AFP’s core capability requirements. Sub-program 2, 
amounting to 167 billion pesos, will be funded from sources other than appropriations 
identified in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7898 or from additional funds generated as a 
result of an increase in the gross domestic product (GDP) in the future. 
Acquisition of defense articles and weapons systems is a very crucial part of the 
AFP Modernization Program, for it comprises the bulk of the budgetary requirement of 
the program. The total capital outlay will have a significant impact on the national budget 
as well as on the country’s trade balance. It is, therefore, essential that an intensive 
review, analysis and evaluation of administrative, technical, financial and counter trade 
considerations be undertaken before acquisition of particular equipment is approved at 
the Department of National Defense level.  
C. OBJECTIVES 
The thesis aims to provide guidance to AFP and Philippine leadership as they 
implement the AFP Modernization Program. It begins by defining Foreign Military Sales 
and Direct Commercial Sales. It then identifies the policies, processes and procedures 
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that govern these two methods of procurement. Finally, it provides an analysis and 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages for the Philippine government of each 
method for acquiring U.S. defense items. The analysis will assist AFP officers involved 
in acquisition and contracting in their decision whether to use either FMS or DCS.  
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis will include the processes and procedures involved in 
Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales, including their advantages and 
disadvantages when used to procure U.S. defense articles within the Philippine 
socioeconomic and political environment. This thesis will also discuss relevant 
procurement laws, rules and regulations, as well as the AFP equipment acquisition 
processes and procedures and analyze their effects on the selection of the best method of 
procurement to be used in the procurement of U.S. defense articles. It will also include an 
analysis of the effects, if any, of using either FMS or DCS on the operational 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
What is the most advantageous method of procurement to be used by the 
Philippine government in the acquisition of defense articles from the United States to be 
used by the Armed Forces of the Philippines? 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
• What is Foreign Military Sales and how does it operate as a model of 
procurement by the Philippine government? 
• What is Direct Commercial Sales and how does it operate as a model of 
procurement by the Philippine government? 
• What are the pertinent laws, rules and regulations, and policies that govern 
Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales when used by the 
Philippine government in its procurement activities? 
• How do defense articles procured through FMS or DCS affect the 
operational effectiveness and efficiency of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines? 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I presents the problem and the background of the thesis. 
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Chapter II provides the historical precedents of Security Assistance provided by 
the United States to foreign countries from the early 1900 to the year 2004. 
Chapter III discusses the security assistance provided to the Philippines and how 
this security assistance affects the security relationships of the Philippines and the United 
States.  
Chapter IV discusses the definitions of FMS and DCS, the policies and 
procedures that govern both methods of procurement in the acquisition of U.S. defense 
articles. Offsets and funding of security assistance are also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter V identifies and examines the major factors that influence decision 
makers in the Philippines in the selection of the method of procurement of U.S. defense 
articles.  
Chapter VI is a comparative analysis between Foreign Military Sales and Direct 
Commercial Sales. 
Chapter VII presents the conclusions and recommendations and suggestions for 
further research on this topic. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology to be used in this thesis will consist of the following: 
• Conduct literature review of books, journal articles, web sites and other 
library information resources. 
• Conduct interviews with Philippines government officials as well as 
procurement/acquisition and contracting officials of the Armed Forces of 
Philippines through telephone calls and e-mail. 
• Conduct visit to Washington, D.C to interview defense officials at the 
office of the Philippines’ Embassy. 
• Conduct interview of U.S. government official involved in acquisition and 
contracting through telephone calls and e-mail. 
• Analyze interview results as they relate to the procurement of US defense 
articles for the RP using FMS or DCS.  
• Analyze the existing literature in conjunction with current Philippine 




H.  SUMMARY 
The Philippines approved the AFP Modernization program February 23, 1995, 
giving impetus to the acquisition of appropriate weapons system and materiel to improve 
the defense capabilities of the AFP. This program is critical to the execution of its 
mandate of protecting the Filipino people and upholding the sovereignty of the State.  
The AFP will use Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 
or both in the acquisition of U.S. defense articles. Each of these two methods of 
procurement has its own advantages and disadvantages when used by the AFP within the 
socio-economic and political environment of the Philippines. This thesis aims to provide 
an objective comparison between FMS and DCS that will assist decision-makers in the 
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II. BACKGROUND TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
A. U.S. ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES  
The transfer of arms and defense articles plays an important role in the foreign 
and national security policies of many nations. History reveals that arms transfers occur 
as a result of the instinct of nations for survival and the promotion of their national 
interest. The transfer method of these arms and defense articles varies depending on the 
prevailing political and economic environment of the countries involved.  
During World War I, the United States was a leading participant in the 
international munitions trade, notwithstanding its initial declaration of neutrality. Despite 
great controversy and public debate arising from U.S. involvement in the international 
arms trade, President Wilson characterized the U.S. and its output of munitions as an 
“arsenal of freedom” (DISAM, 1994).     
The involvement of the United States in international arms trade continued during 
World War II, as the U.S. Congress permitted the sale of arms to the British on a cash-
and-carry basis. U.S. arms transfer policies were broadened to include arms support for 
allied nations. In September 1940, President Roosevelt entered into a destroyers-for-bases 
agreement with the British, in which 50 old destroyers were exchanged for 99-year leases 
of several British bases, as these bases might become critical to American defense 
(DISAM, 1994).  
Likewise, in an effort to provide aid to Britain, Russia and China as they became 
engaged in the war, the U.S. Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. Under 
this act, the United States loaned approximately 50 billion dollars in food, arms, and 
other aid to allies with the premise that they would repay when able to do so or through 
the “reverse lend-lease” arrangement, whereby payment to the United States would be in 
terms of certain materials and services (DISAM, 1994).  
The post-World War II scene was a competition between the United States and 
the USSR, two superpowers having diametrically opposed ideologies, capitalism and 
communism, respectively. In an effort to prevent Soviet-inspired communist insurgencies  
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in Greece and Turkey, President Truman asked Congress in March 1947 for $400 million 
in aid for these two countries. The Truman doctrine justified and accompanied the 
request. 
For three years, Greece and Turkey were continuously provided, free of charge, 
with over $600 million in economic and military aid, administered by the Joint United 
States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), to contain Russian expansion. U.S. 
military assistance after the war consisted mostly of surplus war materiel given to allies 
as “grant aid,” later known as the Military Assistance Program (MAP) (DISAM, 1994).   
President Eisenhower continued the containment policy of President Truman. 
Military assistance became the building block of this containment policy, which was 
expanded to include not only “arms to allies” but also “arms to friends,” referring to 
friendly non-aligned nations in Northeast and Southeast Asia. The Eisenhower doctrine 
was borne out of the need to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East, particularly in 
Syria and Egypt. The doctrine declared that the United States would employ force, if 
necessary, to assist a nation or group of nations in the Middle East requesting assistance 
in the event of an external, communist armed aggression (DISAM, 1994).   
President Kennedy inherited the doctrine of “massive retaliation,” developed 
during the Eisenhower administration, which called for the employment of U.S. 
conventional force capabilities against adversaries. As communist insurgencies began to 
threaten Asian regions, the Military Assistance Program was expanded and became the 
primary element used by the Kennedy-Johnson administration to maintain regional 
stability. Increasing arms sales under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program 
precipitated the gradual reduction of MAP grant aid given to allies (DISAM, 1994).  
In an effort to reduce the number of U.S. troops deployed in Asia to contain 
communist expansion, and driven by the American disappointment over the war in 
Vietnam, President Nixon made an important change in U.S. foreign policy guidelines in 
his speech during a visit to Guam in 1969.  He stated that the United States would keep 
its treaty commitments, provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened the freedom of an 
allied nation, and furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as 
appropriate. This foreign policy, later known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” would assist 
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countries in building and strengthening their own self-defense through U.S. economic 
and military assistance. The Nixon doctrine emphasized that allies would assume the 
primary responsibility for their own defense even if the United States continued to 
participate in their security development program (DISAM, 1994). 
During the Ford administration, Congress acted to check the increasing 
involvement of the United States in arms sales abroad. With “détente” as a major foreign 
policy goal, President Ford’s request for security assistance could no longer be justified 
by the containment of communism, especially if it involved military grant aid. While 
there was a growing demand for security assistance by allies, the President could not just 
grant such a request when Congress continued to block certain types of sales. The 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 was 
passed to reduce arms sales during Ford’s presidency (DISAM, 1994). 
The Ford policy on arms control was further reinforced when, in 1977, President 
Carter stated that the United States would henceforth view arms transfers as an 
“exceptional foreign policy implement,” and that in the future, the burden of persuasion 
for sales would fall on those who favored a particular arms sale, rather than on those who 
opposed it. Human rights issues also became an important consideration in Carter’s 
security assistance program (DISAM, 1994). 
President Reagan’s arms transfer policy viewed arms transfers as an essential 
element of U.S. global defense and an indispensable component of U.S. foreign policy. 
According to the Reagan policy, the United States would only transfer arms to: 
• reinforce military capabilities to assist in the deterrence of aggression, 
especially from the USSR and its surrogates, and reduce the requirement 
for direct U.S. involvement in regional conflict; 
• reinforce the perception of friends and allies that the United States, as a 
partner, is also a reliable supplier with a measurable and enduring stake in 
the security of the recipient country; 
• point out to potential enemies that the United States will not abandon its 





• improve the American economy by assuring a more stable defense 
production base, and by enhancing the balance of payments.  However, 
this objective should not be construed to mean that the approval of the 
transfer of arms will be based solely, or even primarily, on economic 
considerations and gain; 
• enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. military through improved 
possibilities of access to regional bases, ports, or facilities needed for the 
support of deployed forces during contingencies.  Further, security 
assistance should be such to improve the ability of the host nations to 
complement U.S. forces during deployments; and 
• strengthen the stability of a region and the internal security of the 
countries therein by fostering a sense of a recipient nation’s security and 
thereby its willingness to settle disputes amicably.  Through this objective, 
it is held that a government which feels secure is more likely to cope with 
such challenges in a more progressive and enlightened manner (DISAM, 
1994, pp. 23-24). 
The pivotal point of Reagan policy was that the U.S. could not alone defend the 
free world’s interest, but must be ready to strengthen the military capabilities of friends 
and allies by the transfer of arms and other forms of security assistance (Pierre, 1982). 
The U.S. would evaluate the transfer of arms in relation to the net contribution such 
transfers would make to U.S. global or regional security interests (DISAM, 1994). 
President Bush continued the arms transfer and security assistance policies 
formulated during the Reagan presidency. Significant events worldwide, such as the 
political collapse of the Iron Curtain countries in 1989, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, the Middle East peace talks, the economic and political dismemberment of the 
USSR, and the global economic recession of 1991 and 1992, influenced U.S. foreign and 
security assistance policies under President Bush. These developments prompted the flow 
of U.S. foreign assistance in FY 1991, not only to NATO countries and allies but also to 
former Warsaw Pact nations. However, due to continuing domestic economic problems 
in the last year of Bush’s presidency, a decreasing level of security assistance became 
apparent as his administration addressed these problems (DISAM, 1994).  
President Clinton’s administration indicated little change from the foreign policy 
and national security interests and goals of previous administrations. Its policy 
maintained the concept that the transfer of conventional arms is a “legitimate instrument 
of U.S. foreign policy” deserving of U.S. government support (Gultekin, 1998). 
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However, in order to sustain these foreign policy goals, President Clinton had to 
improve the economic situation of the United States. This included encouraging 
embassies abroad to assist U.S. marketing efforts, interpreted to encompass arms sales 
through Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales. Foreign Military Sales in 
1993 alone rose to $33 billion dollars, contributing to the strength of the U.S. defense 
industry (DISAM, 1994). 
After the 9/11 incident in the United States, President George W. Bush, Jr. began 
building an international coalition that included NATO. The day after the attack, NATO 
affirmed that the attack against the United States was also an attack on the alliance. 
Considering the importance of arms transfers to building and maintaining the coalition 
over the long-term, U.S. arms export licensing and Foreign Military Sales were 
accelerated. Easier access to U.S. arms was used as an incentive to attract allies to the 
U.S. cause (“DSCA forms War Room,” 2004).  
The following table summarizes U.S. arms transfer policy from 1913 to 2004. 
 
Table 1. U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, From Woodrow Wilson to George 
Bush, Jr. (From: (Gultekin, 1998) and (“DSCA forms War Room,” 2004). 
 
The Woodrow Wilson Administration 
(1913-1921) 
• American output of munitions as “arsenal of 
freedom”  
 
The Roosevelt Administration 
(1933-1945) 
• The “destroyers-for-bases” arms trade 
during WW II. 
• The United States supplied about 50 billion 
dollars in food, arms and other aid to allies 
through the “lend-lease program. 
• Use of the “Reverse-Lend-Lease” as a 
means of payment by allies. 
 
The Truman Administration 
(1945-1953) 
• To support free people with economic and 
financial aid. 
• The policy of aid became a precedent  for 
“collective security”.  
 
The Eisenhower Administration 
(1953-1961) 
• Military assistance became the building 





The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations 
(1961-1969) 
• Military assistance was primarily used to 






• The Nixon Doctrine 
• The emphasis on arms sales as a major 
policy instrument 
• Sending arms instead of U.S. troops 
 
The Ford Administration 
(1973-1977) 
• The continuation of the Nixon Doctrine 
• The growing anxiety of Congress over U.S. 
arms transfers 
• Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 
 
The Carter Administration 
(1977-1981) 
• The Carter Doctrine 
• Arms transfers viewed as an “exceptional 
foreign policy instrument”. 
• Attempts to reduce U.S. arms sales. 
 
The Reagan Administration 
(1981-1989) 
• Arms sales were an essential and 
indispensable component of U.S. foreign 
policy. 
• Arms sales were integral to countering the 
growing Soviet influence abroad 
 
The Bush Sr. Administration 
(1989-1993) 




The Clinton Administration 
(1993-2001) 
• Transfer of conventional arms as a 
“legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign 
policy”  
• Restraint of arms transfers that may be 
destabilizing or dangerous to international 
peace. 
  
The Bush Jr. Administration 
(2001-2004) 
• Arms transfer is important to building and 
maintaining the international coalition.  
 
B.  SUMMARY  
This chapter presented the evolution of U.S. arms transfer policies from the time 
of President Wilson in the early 1900 to the administration of President Bush, Jr. in 2004. 
It also reveals how security assistance shaped the life of certain nations, both providers 
13 
and receivers of said security assistance. A case in point is the security assistance 
provided by the U.S. to Greece, Turkey and other American allies threatened by Soviet 
communist expansion. These allies remained democratic countries, thanks in part to the 
security assistance provided as part of the containment policy of the United States.  
The economic difficulties in the 1990s affected the U.S. security assistance 
programs to allies. To sustain foreign policy goals, the U.S. increased its marketing 
efforts abroad for cash sales of defense articles to improve the U.S. economy.  
Security assistance for the 21st century focused on supporting the U.S. global war 
against terrorism. Security assistance to allies and friendly countries supporting the 
foreign policy of the United States on counterterrorism was increased and facilitated.  
The next chapter traces the history of security assistance provided to the 
Philippines, and the manner in which this security assistance influenced the political and 
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III. HISTORY OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE 
PHILIPPINES  
A.  PRE-WORLD WAR II SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
The transfer of U.S. defense articles to the Philippines began shortly before the 
outbreak of World War II. The U.S. Congress authorized the Secretary of the Navy to sell 
naval equipment, non-transferable to third parties, to the Philippines at prices not less 
than cost (Meyer, 1965).  
Even before World War II broke out, the Philippines was already promised its 
independence by the United States. World War II intervened and it was only on July 4, 
1946 that it had gained its independence. Having been physically, economically and 
militarily devastated during World War II, the Philippines had no other alternative but to 
accept an offer from the United States to retain its bases in the Philippines. The retention 
of the Philippine bases by the Americans has its basis in U.S. Senate Resolution 93 on 3 
November 1943. This document in part, authorized the President of the United States, 
with the President of the Commonwealth or Republic, “to withhold and acquire and to 
retain such bases, and the right incident thereto as he may deemed necessary for the 
mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and the United States” (Gregor and Aganon, 
1987, p. 6).  
B.  POST-WORLD WAR II SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
The mutual protection clause in the resolution obligated the United States to 
extend economic and military assistance to the Philippines. In June 1946, President 
Truman approved the Philippine Military Assistance Act which authorized the United 
States to conduct training and provide equipment to the Philippine military. Soon after its 
approval, the U.S. government earmarked $100 million for arms and equipment to the 
Philippine Army. These materials consisted of surplus goods and installations, excluding 
aircraft, but including most types of maritime equipment and non-demilitarized material 
(Meyer, 1965). 
The Philippines was formally granted its independence on July 4, 1946. After 
gaining independence, the Philippines entered into several treaties with the United States. 
The Military Bases Agreement (MBA), signed on March 1947 by President Roxas and 
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U.S. Ambassador Paul McNutt, allowed the United States rent-free use of 23 military 
base sites in the Philippines for 99 years. The agreement also outlined criminal 
jurisdiction authority for offenses committed by American servicemen in the Philippines 
(Meyer, 1965).  
Following the signing of the MBA, the Military Assistance Agreement was signed 
on March 21, 1947, which mandated the United States to furnish military assistance to 
the Philippines. The Philippines received 83 ships for offshore patrols but America 
retained title to the equipment. The agreement also mandated the creation of the Joint 
United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) to provide military advice and 
training to the Philippine armed forces (MAA, 1947). This training included jet pilots at 
Clark Field, the delivery of training jets, minesweepers and ammunition, the 
improvement of airfields, and the construction of warehouses and divisional training sites 
(Taylor, 1963).  
Due to the weak defense capabilities of the Philippines immediately after World 
War II, and doubting the sincerity of the Americans to help the Philippines in case of an 
external attack on the Philippines as a reflection of their experience during the Japanese 
occupation, President Quirino sought military arrangements that would ensure security 
protection from the United States. This led to the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
by the United States and the Philippines in Washington, D.C. on August 30, 1951. The 
treaty generally states that “an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the parties in 
the Pacific would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act 
to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional process”(MDT, 1951).  
Despite the growing threat of communism in Southeast Asia and the indigenous 
communist movement in the Philippines, military assistance was limited and slow in 
coming in the Philippines. Despite continuing criticism, the United States repeatedly 
assured the Philippines of immediate and automatic response, in case of an outside 
aggression, further assuring Filipinos there was no immediate external threat against the 
country (Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971). 
It was only during an actual communist armed aggression against South Korea in 
1950 that President Truman directed the acceleration of the delivery of military assistance 
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to the Philippines. These military assistance funds were used to strengthen the 
Philippines’ military capability to deter communist aggression which was then gaining 
influence in Southeast Asia. Defense articles transferred to the Philippines at that time 
consisted of counterinsurgency equipment such as patrol and landing craft, T-28 and T-
33 trainer aircraft, and helicopters (Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971).  
Meanwhile, the local armed communist group, known as Hukbong Bayan Laban 
sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP), continued to be a security problem since after World War II 
until the early 1950’s. Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay was credited 
with breaking the backbone of the local communist group, not only because of his 
leadership but also due to the increased U.S. security assistance during that time (Taylor, 
1963).  
On May 15, 1958, the United States and the Philippine government established a 
Mutual Defense Board to look into and supervise the implementation of three bilateral 
military treaties-namely the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the Military Assistance 
Agreement and the Military Bases Agreement (Cabal, 1960). 
In an effort to provide military capabilities against outside aggression, the U.S.-
R.P. Mutual Defense Board considered the establishment of missile bases in the 
Philippines. Despite strong opposition from Filipino nationalists, the Philippines received 
18 F-86D and 40 F-86F Sabres armed with Sidewinder anti-aircraft missiles in 1957-58, 
while in 1965-67, 19 F-5A and three F-5B Freedom Fighters were received under the 
U.S. military aid program (Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971). For the period 1955-60, the 
United States has transferred in excess of $219,000,000 in military assistance to the 
Philippine government, an amount continuously denied by Philippines defense officials 
claiming that only 70% of this amount was received by the country (Daniel, 1960). 
The administration of President Marcos was very supportive of the foreign policy 
initiatives of President Johnson. President Marcos manifested his full support for the U.S. 
effort in Vietnam by sending a 2000-man contingent and extolled the United States to 
maintain its role to deter communism in Asia.  President Johnson called Mr. Marcos his 
“strong right arm in Asia” (Berry, 1989). 
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President Johnson provided full U.S. support to the Philippine efforts to obtain 
loans from international lending institutions such as the World Bank. He also provided 
the necessary equipment for five engineer construction battalions designed to conduct 
civic action functions in the Philippines. This military aid was to be delivered during FY 
1967, with the equipment for the five additional battalions to be made available in FY 
1968. The U.S. government also extended $38,809,661 in financial support to the 
Philippine troops in Vietnam. (Berry, 1989) 
Meanwhile, military base renegotiation continued between the United States and 
the Philippines during the Ford presidency to iron out criminal and sovereignty issues as 
well as compensation or rent for the bases. Unfortunately, the negotiations were stalled in 
1975 due to disagreements on the amount of compensation and sovereignty issues. The 
United States reduced its military assistance to the Philippines despite the growing 
communist threat and the emergence of the Muslim armed secessionist movement in the 
Philippines at that time. The Philippines received only $8 million in security assistance in 
the few years preceding 1979 (Taccad, 1978).  This amount contrasted noticeably with 
the aid received by those countries hosting military bases, such as Spain, Turkey, and 
Greece. These governments concluded a $1.2 billion 5-year agreement, a $1.0 billion 4-
year agreement and $700 million 4-year agreement, respectively (Gregor and Aganon, 
1987).  
When President Carter won the Presidency, most of those opposed to President 
Marcos had high hopes that U.S. military assistance to the Philippines would finally end 
due to the poor human rights record of the Marcos administration. However, it was 
during Carter’s presidency that the U.S. became interested in renegotiating the terms for 
the bases, including rent or compensation. An amendment to the Military Bases 
Agreement was signed in 1979. In addition to significant provisions contained in the 
amendment, President Carter promised Mr. Marcos, his ‘best effort” to provide 500 
million dollars in U.S. military and economic aid, representing an increase of 163 percent 
for FY 1980 as compared to FY 1979 (Berry, 1989). 
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Substantial military assistance continued to pour in during the time of President 
Ronald Reagan, who called Mr. Marcos a “personal friend”. In 1983, President Reagan 
sent a letter to President Marcos pledging his “best effort” to obtain security assistance 
for the Philippines in the following categories and amounts over the next five years; 
• Military assistance------------------------$125 million 
• Foreign military sales credit (FMS)----$300 million 
• Economic support fund assistance------$475 million 
Reagan also sought a 10-year grace period for the FMS credits granted the 
Philippines, thus spreading repayment over a period of 20 years (Berry, 1989).  
During Aquino’s presidency, 1986 to 1992, the Philippine government tried to 
negotiate a higher compensation for the use of its bases. By 1989, compensation would 
have reached a billion dollars per year, while aid payments to the Philippines for 1982-
1987 averaged $180 million (Webb, 1993). In 1988, President Aquino finally agreed to 
$481 million compensation per year for FY 1990 and FY 1991 but emphasized that the 
future negotiations would require substantial changes (“Philippines: Foreign Military 
Relations,” 2004). The base renegotiations in 1991 failed, which led to the complete pull-
out of U.S. forces from the Philippines in 1992. 
As the RP-U.S. Military Bases Agreement had been terminated, RP-U.S. military 
exercises on Philippine territory were suspended. President Ramos’ extension of a pre-
existing Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which would establish the legal status of 
U.S. forces stationed in the Philippines, was also rejected by the Philippine Supreme 
Court (Hubbard, 2001).  Nonetheless, between 1992 and 1998, the Philippines received, 
free of charge, Excess Defense Articles, as follows: 3,638 M-14 rifles; 16,488 M-1911 
pistols; 10 M-240 machineguns; 22,500 Colt M16A1 automatic rifles and two refurbished 
Lockheed Martin C-130B transport planes. These giveaways have paid off with the 
purchased, through Direct Commercial Sales, from the U.S. of 12 Commando V-300 
armored personnel carriers, 12 V-300 infantry fighting vehicles, 5 McDonnel Douglas 
530-MG Defender helicopters and 5 second hand Cessna-172/T-41 aircraft by the 
Philippine government. (“Arming an Old Enemy,” 2004). 
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When President Estrada was elected in 1998, he advocated strong U.S.-Philippine 
ties. He actively supported approval of the 1999 U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces 
Agreement which would allow RP-U.S. joint military training exercises and U.S. troops 
access to Philippine ports (VFA, 1999). The Philippines was also provided a FMF 
program fund of $2 million for CY 2001. The Estrada administration also volunteered to 
send 750 troops to join the International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET) and in 
exchange, the Philippines received U.S. aid in the form of trucks to help it accomplish its 
mission in East Timor (Hubbard, 2001).  
C.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took over the presidency from President 
Estrada in January 2001. After the attacks by Muslim terrorists on the World Trade 
Center in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. on September 11, 
2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo immediately expressed her support for 
President Bush’s call for a global coalition against terrorism (Hubbard, 2001).  
She also sent a small military contingent for humanitarian and civic actions to join 
the coalition forces in Iraq. In return for this manifestation of support, President Bush, in 
a joint statement issued in Washington during President Macapagal-Arroyo’s state visit, 
designated the Philippines as a major non-NATO ally, thus giving the Philippines greater 
access to supplies and materials from the United States. In 2001, the Philippines was  
due to receive one C-130B Hercules transport aircraft and five UH-1H helicopters, drawn 
cost-free from Excess Defense Articles (EDA) stocks. In 2002, the U.S. State Department 
also proposed that the Philippines receive $19 million FMF credit (Karniol, 2001).  
President Bush also pledged the following assistance for FY 2003: 
• $30 million in new grant aid for equipment and training of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines. 
• $30 million in new bilateral development assistance for Mindanao and 
support for the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.  
• $25 million in new grant assistance to train and equip a combat 
engineering unit and provide military needs in the war on terror (“RP-US 
Relations,” 2003, p. 1). 
The U.S. government has also promised delivery of 20 UH-1H helicopters to the 
Philippine Air Force, together with funding for their refurbishment, and to supply the 
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AFP with approximately 50,000 new rifles by 2003. However, it was able to deliver only 
8 UH-1H and 15,000 M-16 rifles by the end of CY 2003 (“Defense Equipment 
Requirements,” 2004). Total U.S. military aid for CY 2003 amounted to US$114.46 
million (“U.S. Military Aid to the Philippines,” 2003). 
Finally, the Bush administration has also asked Congress for $164 million 
military and economic assistance for the Philippines in FY 2005 (Katigbak, 2004). 
D.  SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined U.S. security assistance to the Philippines from the period 
prior to World War II through the 21st century war against terrorism.  Little U.S. security 
assistance was provided to the Philippines shortly before World War II. After World War 
II, the Philippines depended significantly on the United States for security assistance to 
develop its armed forces. To address its security concerns, the Philippines allowed the 
use of its bases by the U.S. and also entered into several security treaties with the United 
States. The amount of security assistance to the Philippines appeared to have been tied to 
the support by Philippine political leaders for the foreign policy and security interests of 
the United States.  
The U.S. bases in the Philippines later became a major source of irritation 
between the Philippines and the U.S. due to sovereignty and compensation issues. RP-US 
bases negotiators failed to agree on some issues, leading to the termination of the MBA in 
1991 and the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines.  From 1994 to 
1998, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funding used to finance FMS for the Philippines 
was halted.    
FMF funding in support of FMS purchase of U.S. defense articles was renewed in 
1999 after the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement allowing U.S. access to port and 
training facilities in the Philippines. It started to increase in 2001 as the Philippines 
actively supported the United States global war against terrorism.  
The next chapter will discuss two components of security assistance by which 
U.S. defense articles are transferred to the Philippines. These are Foreign Military Sales 
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IV. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON FMS AND DCS  
A. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
1. Definition 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a component of the United States Security 
Assistance Program authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). It provides for 
the transfer of defense articles and/or defense services, including training, to eligible 
foreign purchasers. It is a government-to-government sale of U.S. defense articles and 
services, usually from Department of Defense (DoD) stocks or through new procurement 
under DoD-managed contracts (DoD 5105.38-M, 2003). 
2. Basic Policies 
a. Eligibility 
Defense articles and/or services may be sold or leased to a country or 
international organization only if the President of the United States, in accordance with 
AECA, determines that the prospective purchaser is eligible based on the following 
criteria: 
• The President finds that the furnishing thereof will strengthen U.S. 
security policy and promote world peace. 
• The country or international organization has agreed not to transfer title to, 
or possession of, any defense article or related training or other defense 
service so furnished to it, or permit the use of such an article or related 
training or other defense service for purposes other than those for which 
furnished unless the consent of the President has first been obtained. 
• The country or international organization shall have agreed to provide 
substantially the same degree of security protection afforded to such 
article by the United States.  
• The country or international organization is otherwise eligible to purchase 
or lease defense articles or defense services (DISAM Online Green Book, 
2003, Chapter III). 
This eligibility is confirmed by a “Presidential Determination” written and 
signed by the President in the form of “Memorandum for the Secretary of State” 




b. FMS Authorization Acts 
The transfer of defense articles from the United States to a potential 
purchaser country is governed by two basic congressional acts, as follows: 
• The Foreign Assistance Acts (FAA) of 1961, originally enacted on 
September 4, 1961, is the authorizing legislation for Economic Support 
Fund (ESF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), 
Transfer of Excess Defense Articles (EDA), Peacekeeping Operations 
(PKO), and other foreign non-military related assistance programs. FAA 
was also the basic authority for FMS prior to 1968. (DISAM Online Green 
Book, 2003).  
• The (AECA) was formerly the Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1968 
(FMSA). It was amended and changed to its current name in 1976. The 
AECA provides the policies that govern the licensing and sale of U.S. 
defense articles through Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military 
Sales (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003). Figure 1 shows evolution of 
significant Security Assistance Authorization Acts. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Major Security Assistance Authorization Acts since 1954. (From: DISAM 
Online Green Book, 2003) 
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c. Appropriations Acts 
An appropriation act is the authority for funding the security assistance 
programs. Appropriations for Security Assistance are included in the annual “Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act” for each year 
(DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).  
B. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROCESS AND PROCEDURES 
1. Definition of Requirements/Initiation 
A country’s requirements for defense articles arise because of needs, to include: 
• to establish a new operational capability 
• to improve an existing capability 
• to exploit an opportunity to reduce cost or enhance performance, and 
• to preserve a current capability through maintaining or replenishing 
inventory (Engelbeck, 2002, p. 88). 
Once a purchaser country has determined the defense articles for procurement and 
has decided to procure the articles from the United States, it will still have to choose 
whether to buy the item through FMS or DCS. 
A purchaser country intending to use FMS in its procurement of U.S. defense 
articles begins planning on how it can get the best value for every dollar spent on 
procurement. During the planning process, purchaser country representatives discuss 
their defense requirements and special needs with U.S. Security Assistance Organization 
(SAO) personnel stationed in the country. This discussion includes technical and 
financial requirements, systems information, conformance with U.S. security assistance 
plans and other security related issues (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003). Figure 2 
shows the basic process being followed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines prior to 








































Figure 2.   Basic Process Followed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Prior to 
Preparation of Letter of Request (LOR). (From: Briefing Presentation of MGen. 
Castellano, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, AFP at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, December 2003) 
 
2. Letter of Request (LOR) – Channels of Submission 
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process begins when a purchasing eligible 
foreign country sends a request for information, referred to as Letter of Request (LOR) 
for defense articles or services considered for purchase (DoD 5105.38-M, 2003).  
The purchaser country determines the channels of submission for the Letter of 
Request (LOR) based upon whether the request is for “Significant Military Equipment 
(SME)” or for all other FMS (non-SME) requirements. SME are items in the U.S. 
munitions list designated in the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) that 
warrant special export controls because of their capacity for substantial military utility. 
Requests for Major Defense Equipment are treated as request for SME (DISAM Online 
Green Book, 2003). Major defense equipment includes items having nonrecurring 
research and development cost of more than $50 million or a total production cost of 
more than $200 million (DoD 5105.38-M, 2003).   
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Requests for SME must be forwarded by the purchaser country to the U.S 
Embassy which transmits the same LOR to the DoD Component or Implementing 
Agency (IA) with an attached justification, commonly referred to as “country team 
assessment” for the request. A Country Team Assessment includes the reason(s) why the 
country needs the SME/MDE from the U.S., evidence of ability to operate, finance, 
maintain and support it, as well as the reaction of neighboring countries to said sale. 
Information copies are furnished to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), 
Department of State, Politico-Military Affairs (DoS/PM), and the appropriate Combatant 
Command by the IA. The DoS and DSCA initiate the necessary coordination to 
determine if there will be any objection to the proposed sale, while the Implementing 
Agency validates said LOR as to the eligibility of the potential purchaser country for 
FMS,  that the request was transmitted through proper channels, and that the items sought 
may be sold. The Military Articles and Services List (MASL) maintained by DSCA 
provides a generic listing of military articles and services available for sale under FMS 
(DISAM Online Green Book, 2003). The basic channels of requests for FMS are 




Figure 3.   Channels of Request for FMS. (From: DISAM Online Green Book, 2003) 
 
For non-SME, LORs are transmitted either by the purchaser's authorized 
representative or by the U.S. country team directly to the appropriate DoD Implementing 
Agency with information copies to the DoS/PM, appropriate Combatant Command and 
DSCA. LORs may be submitted directly to DoS(PM) and DSCA if the U.S. Embassy or 
the purchaser country believes that the request is sensitive and requires a higher level 
policy determination or if the submission channel is unclear (DISAM Online Green 
Book, 2003). 
3. Price and Availability (P&A) Data  
The LOR from a purchaser country should indicate whether the request is for 
Price and Availability (P&A) data or a request for Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). 
P&A data are rough estimates of cost and the projected availability of the U.S. defense 
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articles or services. The P&A data estimate is normally provided to the prospective 
purchaser by the IA within 45 days after receipt of the LOR. P&A data is not valid for 
use in the preparation of a LOA or for use in budgeting but is for planning purposes only 
by the purchasing country (DoD 5105.38-M, 2003).  
4. The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) 
The LOA is the authorized document used by the USG as an offer to sell defense 
articles and defense services to a purchaser country. Once the Implementing Agency 
receives the LOR and after checking its validity and completeness, the IA will prepare 
the LOA, ensuring that it is in accordance with the FMS Total Package Approach (TPA). 
TPA provides for the necessary support items and services which include training, 
technical assistance, initial support and follow-on support. The LOA is forwarded to the 
purchaser country and becomes a contract when accepted and signed by the purchasing 
country or international organization. A signed LOA now referred to as a Foreign 
Military Sales “case”, is assigned a unique case identifier to differentiate it from other 
cases (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).  
Before issuing the letter of offer to sell defense articles or services worth $50 
million or more, or any design and construction services worth $200 million or more, or 
major defense equipment for $14 million or more, the President is required to submit 
justification to Congress with respect to such offer (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).  
FMS “cases” are categorized into Defined Order cases, Blanket Order cases, and 
Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA). The definitions of these 
cases are as follows: 
a. Defined Order Case 
A defined order case is the type of FMS case used when the articles or 
services provided are specifically identified by the purchaser in the Letter of Request 
(LOR). The following defense articles are normally processed as defined order cases: 
• Major items and weapons systems 
• Munitions, ammunitions and other explosives 
• Transportation services 
• Aircraft ferry  
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• Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices  
• Technical data packages (SAMM, 2003).  
b. Blanket Order Case 
A blanket order case is when no definitive listing of items or quantities is 
set but the LOA specifies a dollar ceiling against which orders may be placed. Customers 
may requisition against a blanket order case as long as funds are available. The types of 
defense articles normally considered under this category include: 
• spare and repair parts 
• publications 
• support equipment 
• minor modifications/alterations performed at United States military 
installations 
• technical assistance services 
• training and training aid devices 
• reparables (SAMM, 2003). 
c. Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement 
A Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement is an FMS case 
wherein a military logistics support arrangement is designed to provide follow-on logistic 
support for U.S. defense articles acquired by purchaser countries. The arrangements 
provide for the execution of two Foreign Military Sales Orders (FMSOs) covering 
stockage, consumption, and storage requirements.  
• FMSO case I covers the estimated dollar value of the total initial list of 
items and quantities to be stocked and maintained on order from sources 
for the support of the purchaser’s U.S.-furnished equipment.  
• FMSO case II covers the estimated annual withdrawals from the U.S. 
supply system by the purchasing country.  
The scope of CLSSA sales is limited by the LOA description of end items 
to be supported and dollar values of the FMSO I and II cases, based on the cost of 
forecasted requirements for the anticipated period of support (SAMM, 2003).  
5. Compilation of LOA Data 
The actual LOA data estimates are provided by applicable service 
program/system/item manager and are based on either the U.S. contractor’s cost, or on 
the current cost of the desired items in DoD inventory. The identification of each of the 
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required items and services for major system cases is the primary responsibility of the 
Army Major Subordinate Command, Navy Systems Command, or the Air Force Material 
Command (DISAM Green Book, 2003).  
FMS case managers within these agencies obtain and review the necessary data 
on costs, schedules, configuration, and other factors to prepare an FMS proposal. The 
FMS proposal is also coordinated with other concerned USG agencies. 
The following figures show the U.S. Navy, Army and Air Force organizational 
structure and processing flow for the compilation of data for a major weapons systems 
sale (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003). 
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Figure 4.   Department of the Navy Functional Organization for Security Assistance. 





Figure 5.   Department of the Army Functional Organization for Security Assistance. 
(From: DISAM Online Green Book, 2003) 
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Figure 6.   U.S. Air Force Functional Organization for Security Assistance. (From: 
DISAM Online Green Book, 2003) 
 
6. Preparation of the Final LOA 
After checking for the completeness and validity of the LOR, the Implementing 
Agency writes the LOA.  The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), 
Virginia, for the U.S. Army, the International Programs Office (Navy IPO) for the Navy, 
and the Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) for the Air Force 
write the major system LOAs. Follow-on support and spare parts LOAs are written and 
managed by the USASAC, New Cumberland for the Army, Air Force Security 
Assistance Center (AFSAC) for the U.S. Air Force, and the Navy Inventory Control Point 
for FMS (NAVICP-OF) for the U.S. Navy (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003). 
7. Final Review of LOA 
a. DSCA Countersignature 
The IA forwards the LOA to the DSCA Comptroller for countersignature 
prior to release to the purchaser.  DSCA comptroller reviews the LOA with regard to 
policy compliance, payment schedule and pricing, and records data from the LOA into 
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the Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS) data system. DSCA also 
reviews those cases which must be presented to Congress for their review (DISAM 
Online Green Book, 2003). 
b. Other DSCA Coordination Actions 
DSCA completes policy and technical review of the LOA, makes any 
other necessary coordination and then submits the LOA for review by the State 
Department.  If the State Department approves the LOA, and if Congress does not object 
to the proposed sale within 30 calendar days, the DSCA Comptroller “countersigns” the 
LOA and forwards it to the IA for submission to the requesting government.  At the same 
time, a copy is sent to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Denver Center, 
Directorate for Security Assistance (DFAS-DE) for their information (DISAM Green 
Book, 2003). 
8. Acceptance of Offer by Purchaser 
Upon receipt of the LOA, the purchaser country is given 60 days to decide 
whether to accept or reject the LOA. An accepted and signed LOA is forwarded to the 
Implementing Agency and to DFAS-DE with the required initial payment on or before 
the Offer Expiration Date (OED) as indicated on the LOA.  Payment must be in U.S. 
dollars and may be transmitted by check or wire transfer to the Department of the 
Treasury. Within five days of acceptance, the SAO should advise DSCA, DFAS-DE, and 
the IA of the acceptance of the LOA by the purchaser country (DISAM Online Green 
Book, 2003). 
9. FMS Pricing 
The methodology employed in developing an FMS price depends upon whether 
that price is to be placed on an LOA as a cost estimate or whether it is the price which is 
later reported in the billing system after delivery of an article or service. The prices 
entered on an LOA are projected cost estimates of the articles and services to be 
delivered in the future. Prices put into the billing system represent the actual costs of 
articles and services delivered to FMS purchasers. However, the exact cost of major 
procurements may not be determined until the total contracts for all systems obtained 
under such procurements are complete (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).  
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FMS prices are calculated using two price elements, the base price and the 
authorized charges. The base price calculation differs if the item is sold from the DoD 
stock or from new procurement. If the item is to be sold from DoD stock, the cost of the 
item is the inventory value. The base price for new procurement is the purchase price of 
the item or the full amount of the contract. “Authorized charges” are added to both the 
DoD’s stock and new procurement’s cost, consisting of the investment costs and 
operating costs (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).  
Investment costs are the Non-recurring Costs (NC) incurred in Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funded through appropriation. NC charges 
are applicable only in FMS sales of SME/MDE having a NC RDT&E of $50 million or a 
production cost of $200 million. Contract administration services (CAS) charges are the 
costs incurred by contract administration offices as listed in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), and include reviewing contractors’ compensation structure, consent to 
the placement of subcontracts, pre-award surveys, quality assurance and inspection, 
making payments on assigned contract, contract audit, and other related charges. CAS 
charges may range from 0.2 to 1.7 percent of the item’s purchased cost. Administrative 
charges, which may range from 2.5 to 5 percent of the purchased price of the item(s), are 
expenses incurred by DoD contracting personnel in sales negotiations, case 
implementation, program control, computer programming, accounting and budgeting, and 
general administrative support of the FMS program. Accessorial costs are expenses 
incident to issues, sales, and transfer of materiel that are not included in the price of the 
materiel. Examples of these charges are the Packing, Crating and Handling (PCH) cost, 
which is pegged at 3.5 percent of the purchased price of the item(s), and transportation 
costs which may range from 3.75 to 16.25 percent of the purchased price. The Logistics 
Support Charge (LSC), pegged at 3.1 percent of the purchased price, is a cost that may be 
added to FMS sales of spare parts, supplies and maintenance of customer-owned 
equipment to recoup an appropriate share of the cost incurred in logistics support 






Figure 7.   FMS Pricing Formula. (From: DISAM Green Book, 2003) 
 
The U.S. government is mandated to recover all costs associated with FMS cases 
except when waived or reduced by the proper authority. The Standard Terms and 
Conditions of the LOA will indicate whether or not the U.S. government will procure and 
provide the U.S. defense articles required by the FMS eligible purchaser on a “nonprofit-
no loss” basis (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003). 
10. Implementation of the Case 
After receiving the required initial payment, DFAS-DE releases the Obligational 
Authority (O/A) to the Implementing Agency (IA). The USG fulfills the FMS 
requirements by procuring new items or providing them from DoD stocks. FMS 
requirements may be consolidated with DoD requirements or implemented separately, 
whichever is more expedient and cost effective. The Implementing Agency may create an 
office or position within their organization to manage the FMS program and serve as an 
interface with other organizations involved in managing the program. Although the LOA 
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provides the basic information and authority for the FMS case, it still needs a FMS “case 
directive” prepared by a program or case manager for its successful implementation 
(DISAM Green Book Online, 2003). 
11. FMS Case Closure 
When all items and services listed in the LOA have been delivered or performed, 
an FMS case is considered supply complete and is then ready to undergo the FMS case 
closure process wherein reconciliation between the purchasing country and the DFAS-DE 
and IA will be accomplished. An FMS case is considered closed when DFAS-DE issues a 
final statement of account (DD645) to the customer.  DFAS-DE can issue a final bill only 
after the implementing agency (IA) has submitted a case closure certificate to DFAS-DE 






























Figure 8.   Case Closure. (From: Briefing Presentation of MGen. Castellano, Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Logistics, AFP at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, December 2003) 
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C. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES LICENSED UNDER THE AECA 
1. Definition 
A Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) is a sale made by a U.S. defense contractor 
directly to a foreign buyer without U.S. government intervention except for the licensing 
of the export sale in accordance with the AECA (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).  
2. Basic Policies and Procedures 
The law that gives authority for the transfer of U.S. defense articles through a 
Direct Commercial Sales is the AECA of 1976, specifically Section 38 (Arms Export 
Control Act P.L 90-629). Direct Commercial Sales are not administered by DoD. The 
purchaser country will select the source and manage the awarded contract directly with 
the U.S. contractor. If the purchaser decides to buy its defense needs directly from a U.S 
defense contractor, it is still subject to the review and approval of the DSCA as well as 
DoS. A U.S. company that wishes to sell defense articles directly to foreign purchaser 
must first request DSCA to enter into such a sales arrangement, and if approved, is given 
the “DCS Preference” authority valid for one year.  
However, this approval does not in itself constitute an approval to transfer the 
defense articles. Exports of defense articles are authorized only after a munitions export 
license is obtained from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) within DoS. 
Furthermore, if the proposed sale is an MDE worth in excess of $14 million or other 
defense articles/services worth in excess of $50 million, the President must submit a 
numbered certification to the Congress. An export license may not be issued within the 
30-calendar day Congressional review period unless the President states in his 
certification that an emergency exists. Likewise, no export license shall be issued if 
Congress adopts a joint resolution objecting to the proposed sale. Applicable rules and 
procedures for Direct Commercial Sales are contained in the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003). 
D. OFFSETS IN FMS AND DCS  
Countertrade, as defined in the “Handbook on the Countertrade Program of the 
Philippines,” is a general term for an international transaction premised on some form of 
reciprocity. Various forms of countertrade used in the Philippines include 
counterpurchase, offsets, product buy back, debt-for-goods, build-operate-transfer, and 
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any combination of the above (Handbook on the Countertrade Program of the 
Philippines, 2002, pp. 1-4). A sample text of an undertaking to pursue countertrade 
relative to the supply of an item/defense article as used in the Philippines is as shown 
below. (Venturanza, Personal Communication, May 5, 2004) 
 
UNDERTAKING TO PURSUE COUNTERTRADE RELATIVE TO THE 
SUPPLY OF 
                                        Cite type of Importation 
 
Pursuant to E.O. 120 s. 1993 relative to the adoption of COUNTERTRADE in 
government procurement, and in order to assist in the economic progress of the 
Philippines, the undersigned bidder hereby commits that should it be awarded the 
supply contract for the above-cited project by ( Name of Importing Government 
Office) it shall, directly or through a nominated third party, undertake 
countertrade arrangements equivalent to ____% (not less than fifty percent 
(50%)) of the value of the total Contract Price of the Supply Contract, said 
countertrade arrangements to be concluded in writing between the undersigned 
bidder and Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) – the herein 
countertrade nominee of the Philippine Government – within (90) days from the 
signing of the said Supply Contract. 
Failure on the part of the undersigned bidder to comply with this Undertaking 
shall entitle (Name of Importing Government Office) to rescind/cancel the 
Supply Contract and award the same to another party and/or disqualify the 
undersigned from participating in future supply contracts with the said 
government office without liability on the part of the latter. 
This Undertaking shall form part of the undersigned’s bid tender for the above 
project.  
 
Issued this ______ day of _______ in _________, Philippines. 
 
________________     ___________________ 
Name of Company     Name of Representative 
(Supplier/Bidder) 
       ___________________ 
       Signature 
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Counterpurchase occurs when the seller of defense articles agrees to buy or to 
find a buyer for a specific value of goods, often stated as a percentage of the value of the 
exported item, from the buyer’s country. This form of countertrade is sometimes called 
counter export (Handbook on Countertrade, 2002). Most of the countertrade performed in 
the Philippines is in the form of counterpurchase. The most significant example was the 
1992 purchase of 150 Armored Personnel Carriers from the United Kingdom, costing 
US$62 million, which resulted in a 100 percent counterpurchase. Products bought by the 
seller of this defense equipment were agricultural products from the Philippines 
(Handbook on the Countertrade Program of the Philippines, 2002). 
Product Buy Back occurs when the seller of defense articles agrees to accept as 
full or partial payment products derived from the exported defense articles. For example, 
the seller of a Tomato Processing Machine agrees to be paid partially through the export 
of canned tomato paste processed from the machine.   
Debt-for-Goods is a transaction whereby a debtor country offers its goods or 
services for export to cover full or partial payment of an outstanding debt (Handbook on 
the Countertrade Program of the Philippines, 2002). An example of a debt-for-goods 
countertrade occurred in 1998 when the National Electrification Administration of the 
Philippines incurred debt from China for the purchase of mini-hydro equipment. The 
Philippines paid its debt by exporting copper cathodes (Handbook on the Countertrade 
Program of the Philippines, 2002).  
Offset is another form of countertrade in the Philippines. It is defined as an 
agreement whereby the seller undertakes or introduces a wide range of industrial and 
commercial activities for the benefits of the buyer (Handbook on the Countertrade 
Program of the Philippines, 2002). 
The two main categories of offsets are direct and indirect. Direct offsets occur 
when the offset arrangements required by the purchaser country are directly related to the 
product being purchased. For example, as a condition for the purchase of $1.75 million in 
communication equipment from Motorola of U.S.A. in 1999 by the Philippines, Motorola 
agreed to buy Integrated Circuits (IC) from the Philippines at no additional cost to the 
latter (Handbook on Countertrade Program of the Philippines, 2002).  
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Indirect Offsets occur when the offset arrangement required by the purchaser is 
not related to the product being purchased. For example, as a condition for the purchase 
of the Agusta II S-211 trainer jets program, the seller invested US$16 million in New 
Leyte edible oil and US$8.4 million establishment of Kinshi Philippines at no additional 
cost to the Philippines (Handbook on the Countertrade Program of the Philippines, 2002). 
A type of offset arrangement that requires the seller or producer to manufacture 
its product or part of its product in the purchaser country is coproduction. It normally 
involves a government-to-government licensed production. Licensed production occurs 
when the offset agreement requires that the seller manufacture the defense articles in the 
buyer’s country based on the technical information provided to a producer in the buying 
country.  
Another type of offset arrangement that a buyer country may require from the 
seller is subcontractor production. It is the production of a part or component of defense 
articles being sold by the seller/producer in the buyer’s country. The subcontract does not 
involve the license of technical information and is usually a commercial arrangement 
between the seller and a foreign producer.  
As defined by the Investment Code of the Philippines, investment as an offset 
refers to equity investments made by a non-Philippine national in a Philippine enterprise, 
either in the form of foreign currency or in other assets actually transferred to the 
Philippines through joint venture (Handbook on the Countertrade Program of the 
Philippines, 2002). An example of investment as an offset is when the Philippines 
procured motorcycles from Kawasaki Corporation of Japan in 1997 and Japan agreed to 
invest in the expansion and modernization of its existing plant by constructing additional 
assembly lines and a new painting shop in the Philippines.  
Technology transfer is another offset arrangement that the seller and buyer may 
enter into as a condition of sale. It is the transfer of specialized knowledge related to the 
defense products purchased which are not available in the buyer’s country (Handbook on 
the Countertrade Program of the Philippines, 2002).  
Purchasing governments frequently perceive that offsets provide them certain 
benefits, e.g., preserving foreign exchange, creation of employment, revenue generation 
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and technology transfers, not to mention the political gain that may be attached to the 
offset activity by the buying government. It is possible to achieve these economic 
benefits through various types of offsets as may be agreed upon by the buyer and the 
seller.  
Many economists, on the other hand, view offsets as economically inefficient and 
market distorting. Aware of the adverse effects of offsets in the export of these defense 
articles, the U.S. government established a policy in 1990 that states: 
• No agency of the U.S. Government shall encourage, enter directly into, or 
commit U.S. firms to any offset arrangement in connection with the sale of 
defense goods or services to foreign governments.  
• U.S. Government funds shall not be used to finance offsets in security 
assistance transactions except in accordance with currently established 
policies and procedures. 
• The decision whether to engage in offsets, and the responsibility for 
negotiating and implementing offset arrangements, resides with the 
companies involved. 
• Any exceptions to this policy must be approved by the President through 
the National Security Council (Milligan, 2003). 
For the past several years, some countries have benefited from various offsets 
connected with Foreign Military Sales. Some recipient countries of Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) funds, including Israel, Egypt, Turkey and Greece, used these funds in 
developing their industrial bases and other aspects of their economies through offset 
requirements from U.S. contractors (GAO/NSIAD-94-127, 1994).   
E. FUNDING FOR FMS AND DCS 
Funding for FMS or DCS can either be in the form of cash from the purchaser 
country or in the form of credit/loans received by the purchasing country from the United 
States through its Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP). If the purchasing country 
is funding its FMS procurement from its own national budget, then it is called FMS cash. 
FMS and DCS transactions may also be funded with a FMFP fund when a buyer country 
is eligible to receive such funds and the funds will be used to buy U.S. defense articles. 
The U.S. Congress appropriates the budget for FMFP, which is then managed by the 




This chapter discussed the two components of security assistance which involve 
the transfer of U.S. defense articles to a foreign country: Foreign Military Sales and 
Direct Commercial Sales. Foreign Military Sales is a government-to-government 
transaction for the sale or transfer of defense articles. The sale or transfer is administered 
by DoD and the items for sale or transfer may come from DoD stocks or from new 
procurement. FMS processes and procedures are tedious and characterized by 
bureaucratic red tape as there are many government agencies involved in the transactions. 
The FMS process basically consists of seven phases, namely the Project definition phase, 
the Request phase, the Offer phase, the Acceptance phase, the Implementation phase, the 
Execution phase and case closure. FMS operates on a no profit-no loss basis and as a 
result, charges are added to the FMS price to recover costs to the U.S. government 
associated with the management and implementation of FMS sales. 
Direct Commercial Sales as authorized by the AECA is a sale or transfer of 
defense articles directly to a purchaser country by the U.S. contractor. The government 
does not participate in the sale transactions except for the licensing of the export sale 
performed by the Office of Defense Trade Control under the DoS. However, if the 
purchasing country uses FMF funds to finance procurement of U.S. defense articles using 
DCS, it needs the approval of the U.S. government through DSCA (DoD 5105.38-M, 
2003).  
Before the sale of a defense article to a foreign country, whether through FMS or 
DCS, the country must be eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles. A Presidential 
Determination documented by the President’s written memorandum to the Secretary of 
State affirms eligibility.  Funding for both FMS and DCS may be in cash coming from 
the purchasing country’s national fund or grants/credits provided to an eligible country by 
the U.S. government through its FMFP fund. 
As a national trade policy on foreign procurement, the Philippines demands 
various forms of countertrade for procurement above $1 million from the supplier or 
seller as compensation for the purchase of such defense articles by the Philippine 
government.  
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The next chapter will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these two 
components of security assistance when used within the context of the economic and 
political situation of the Philippines, while at the same time considering relevant existing 
Philippine laws, policies, rules and regulations.  
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V. SIGNIFICANT FACTORS AFFECTING RP IN SELECTING 
METHOD OF PROCUREMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
All foreign procurements for the AFP are centrally managed at General 
Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines (GHQ, AFP), although the 
implementation and contract management will be decentralized to the major service 
commands. The acquisition of defense articles and services by the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines from the United States is executed using two methods of procurement-- 
Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales. FMS and DCS vary in the way they 
are processed but both are governed by existing procurement laws, rules and regulations 
in the Philippines. The relevant laws, rules and regulations influencing equipment 
acquisition in the AFP are discussed below, as well as economic and political factors. 
B.  MAJOR FACTORS CONSIDERED IN SELECTING METHOD OF 
PROCUREMENT 
1. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Equipment Acquisition 
Process 
The Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations (IGRR) of the AFP 
Modernization program prescribes two distinct but sequential stages for procurement, 
namely, the equipment acquisition stage and the contract negotiation stage. Each stage 
requires separate approval by the Secretary of National Defense (DND DC 01, 2000). 
The first stage starts with a requirements generation, sometimes called project 
definition, by the major service command through Project Management Teams (PMTs). 
PMTs are normally composed of at least three military officers headed by a Project 
Manager. A PMT identifies, defines and prepares the Circulars of Requirements (COR) 
and the Bid Evaluation Plan (BEP). The Major Service modernization board will review 
and validate the CORs and forward it to the major service commander for his approval. It 
then submits these requirements to AFP, GHQ through the AFP Modernization Board.  
The AFP Modernization Board at GHQ, together with the AFP-Department of National 
Defense (DND) Technical Working Group, reviews and validates the CORs before  
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submission to the Chief of Staff (CS), AFP for approval. Once approved, the CORs and 
the BEP will be submitted to the DND Review Board. After review and validation, the 
board submits it to the Secretary of National Defense for final approval.  
The second stage follows after the Secretary of National Defense approves the 
CORs and Bid Evaluation Plan submitted by the CSAFP. The SND issues the 
procurement directive, signaling the entry of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) into 
the procurement process. BAC conducts the pre-qualification and eligibility of bidders, 
bidding and post-qualification of Most Advantageous Bid (MAB) in coordination with 
the AFP- Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) Technical Working Group 
(TWG). The AFP-PITC TWG is responsible for the implementation of the counter trade 
policy on foreign procurement. After BAC finally selects the MAB, it then submits the 
same to the CSAFP for his approval and endorsement to the Secretary of National 
Defense. The SND approves the MAB and issues the Notice of Award. BAC prepares 
and finalizes the contract to be reviewed by the CSAFP for subsequent endorsement to 
SND. SND signs the contract and issues a Notice to Proceed (NTP). The implementation 
of the project(s) then takes place. In case of a multi-year contract, copies will be 
forwarded to Congress for the appropriation of funds. If the amount of the contract 
exceeds 300 million pesos, copies will be forwarded to National Economic and 
Development Authority (NEDA) for review and approval prior to implementation 
(Habulan, 2002). 
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Figure 9.   The AFP Equipment Acquisition Process. (From: Habulan, 2002) 
 
2.  Request for Foreign Military Sales  
A request for procurement through the Foreign Military Sales method is a simple 
process. It starts with the definition of requirements by the major service command 
through its modernization or weapons board. The definition of requirements is preceded 
by a discussion or coordination with the Joint United States Military Advisory Group 
(JUSMAG) by the major service commands to determine if the items are available in 
U.S. DoD stocks. A Letter of Request (LOR) for procurement of the U.S. defense articles 
is then prepared and submitted by the major service command to GHQ, AFP. The request 
is then reviewed by the AFP Modernization Board and submitted to the CS, AFP for his 
approval. The approved requirement is then forwarded to the SND for his approval. The 
approved letter request goes back to GHQ, AFP which then prepares an LOR to be 
submitted to JUSMAG or to the Implementing Agency, depending upon whether the 
request is for Significant Military Equipment (SME) or non-SME (Calon, 2004). The 
FMS process as discussed in Chapter II will then apply.  
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3.  Existing Philippine Laws Governing Procurement of Defense Articles 
from Foreign Countries 
A series of laws, rules, policies and regulations has been enacted to govern the 
procurement of defense articles from foreign countries. The most important of these are 
identified below. 
Republic Act 7898 is an act providing for the modernization of the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines. One of its provisions is a requirement to incorporate special foreign 
exchange reduction schemes in the procurement contract or agreement, including 
countertrade, in-country manufacture, co-production, offsets or other innovative 
arrangements. 
Republic Act 6713 establishes a code of conduct and ethical standards for public 
officials and employees. It is intended to uphold the time honored principle of public 
office being a public trust. It also enumerates prohibited acts and transactions and 
provides penalties for their violation. These standards apply in the acquisition of 
equipment and in dealing with contractors, suppliers, proponents and others.  
Republic Act 9184, enacted in CY 2002 and known as the Government 
Procurement Reform Act, contains the general guidelines on how to conduct competitive 
bidding and the alternative modes of procurement, including direct and negotiated 
procurements. It states that all procurement for the national government, its departments, 
bureaus, agencies and offices, including government-owned and controlled corporations, 
shall be governed by principles of transparency, competitiveness, a streamlined 
procurement process and a system of accountability. 
E.O 120 is an executive order issued on August 19, 1993 which directs the 
national government, its departments, bureaus, agencies and offices, including 
government-owned and controlled corporations, to adopt countertrade as a supplemental 
trade tool with respect to the importation or procurement of foreign capital equipment, 
machinery, products, goods and services. The AFP and the PITC signed a memo of 
agreement in May 1996 creating the joint AFP-PITC countertrade working group 
(JCWG). That countertrade is a requirement in defense procurement programs.   
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DND Department Circular 01, dated 6 March 2000 is the Implementing 
Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations (IGRR) of the AFP Modernization Program. One of 
the guidelines (3.2.11) says that in contracts worth US$1 million or more involving the 
acquisition or upgrade of equipment or weapons systems from foreign suppliers, 
Executive Order 120 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) on Countertrade 
shall apply.   
DND Department Circular 04 prescribes guidelines for the implementation of 
countertrade for procurement contracts under the AFP Modernization program. This 
circular covers foreign procurements, including acquisition and upgrades, of equipment 
and weapons systems by the AFP and DND valued at US$1.0 million and above or its 
equivalent in other foreign currency. Table 1 shows the minimum countertrade level of 
commitment required of contractors/suppliers to be eligible as bidders. 
 
Table 2. Countertrade Level of Commitment Required from the Supplier for the 
Purchase of Defense Equipment. (From: Venturanza, Briefing Slides, 2004) 
 
 
MINIMUM COUNTERTRADE LEVEL OF COMMITMENT 
 
Value of Supply Contract (in US$) Countertrade Commitment/Obligations 
 (Minimum)  
 
 
$ 1 M- $20 M 100% of the value of the Supply Contract (SC) 
Between $20 M and $40 M 90% of the value of the SC 
-              $40 M and $60 M 80% of the value of the SC 
-              $60 M and $80 M 70% of the value of the SC 
-              $80 M and $100M 60% of the value of the SC 
over      $100 M 80% of the value of the SC 
 
 
The circular further states that the Secretary of National Defense may revise or 
modify the minimum countertrade obligation on a case-by-case basis if it is in the best 
interest of the government for him to do so. 
Memorandum Circular No. CT-95.1/01 establishes the guidelines for the 
evaluation and approval of offset arrangements to be undertaken pursuant to E.O 120 and 
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).  
50 
AFP Manual 4-6 is also known as the AFP Major Capital Equipment Acquisition 
Manual. It prescribes the capital equipment acquisition process to be followed, defines 
the acquisition organization structures such as committees, working groups and 
management teams to be adopted, describes the AFP Defense Acquisition Code of Ethics 
and Conduct, risk management in the AFP, and discusses the AFP’s self-reliant defense 
program (SRDP). 
The AFP Defense Acquisition Code of Ethics sets forth the general standard to 
be followed by personnel of the AFP in dealing with procurements.  
Finally, DOF/DBM/COA Joint Circular No.4-98 prescribes the rules and 
regulations on the proper handling and administration of the AFP Modernization Act 
Trust Fund (AFPMATF). 
The Philippines will procure its defense articles in accordance with the above 
laws, policies and regulations. The laws, however, are numerous, fragmented and 
sometimes not in agreement, which makes implementation very challenging. The 
provision of countertrade required from contractors as a condition of sale is a common 
thread among these laws, policies rules and regulations on foreign procurement. 
4. Economic Factors 
The Philippine economy remains the major stumbling block in the modernization 
program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. One indicator of economic status of a 
country is its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the total value of all goods and services 
produced within a country during a given year. It is also a measure of the income 
generated by production within a country (“Philippines: Facts at a Glance”, 2004). The 
following chart shows the economic performance of the Philippines in terms of GDP 
from 1997 to 2001, which indicates a generally downward trend.  
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
GDP (current US$ billions) 82.3 65.2 76.2 74.7 71.4 
GDP per Capita (US$) 1,160.0 1,130.0 1,140.0 1,170.0 1,180.0 
 
Table 3. Economic Performance of the Philippines in Terms of GDP from 1997 to 
2001 (From: World Development Indicators, World Bank. www.janes.com. 
Accessed May 20, 2004) 
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Budget allocation for defense in CY 2002 was approximately US$600 million, 
US$500 million in CY 2003, and US$800 million in CY 2004, with an estimated 80 
percent of defense spending allocated to personnel costs (Country Briefing: the 
Philippines- Battling the Home Front, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 2003). Over and above the 
defense budget is the budget for modernization. Funds for the AFP modernization 
program are to come from the P331.6 billion budget allocated and approved by both 
Houses of Congress through Joint Resolution Nr 28 in 1996 (Joint Resolution Nr 28, 
1996). This amount was not completely provided. In CY 2000, the Estrada administration 
only allocated 5.0 billion pesos while the Arroyo administration allocated another 5.4 
billion pesos for CY 2002 to support the modernization program projects of the AFP.  
To jumpstart the modernization program, the AFP in 1996 formulated a five year 
rolling plan based on a budget ceiling of a total of P50 billion for the first five years as 
prescribed under Joint Resolution Nr 28 to support its priority program. The five-year 
rolling plan serves as the basis for the yearly appropriations and as a guide for the DND-
AFP in the implementation of the first five years of the modernization program.  
However, as of April 2004, eight years after approval of JR Nr 28, the total 
amount obligated for the modernization program stands at P6.561 billion but the total 
amount corresponding to the “Notice of Cash Allocation” is only P2.635 billion,  
approximately US$48 million (Trinidad, Personal Communication, May 11, 2004). This 
is only 5.2 percent of the total funds programmed for the five year rolling plan. The term 
obligated means the amount was already programmed to finance the contracts, or 
vouchers are already existent with corresponding funding. It does not, however, 
necessarily mean that cash is actually available to pay the contract(s)/voucher(s). When 
the contract(s)/voucher(s) reach the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), 
DBM will issue a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) for the voucher to signify that cash is 
available and allocated to the contract/voucher. Therefore, even if approved 
contracts/vouchers are in the pipeline, it may not be possible to implement them if cash is 
not available for payment (Trinidad, Personal Communication, May 2004).  
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Since the approval of the AFP Modernization program, the AFP had only 
implemented three out of the 45 projects programmed under subprogram I (Trinidad, 
personal communication, 2004). 
Funding problems continue to haunt the implementation of the AFP 
Modernization program. During a March 2004 interview, Senator Rodolfo Biazon said 
that the implementation of the AFP modernization program may not take place this year 
(2004) due to a lack of funds (“Modernization Funds Stalled,” 2004). An interview with 
Commander Montanez of the AFP Modernization Program Management Office disclosed 
that the real problem causing the slow implementation of the modernization program of 
the AFP is the lack of funds to procure the needed equipment. 
It is significant to note that from 1989 to 2004, the Philippines had procured 
defense articles for the AFP from abroad through Direct Commercial Sales and that most 
of the contracts contain countertrade arrangements. The Philippines used DCS to procure 
materials from suppliers who promised the most benefits in terms of fulfillment of 
defense requirements and economic development. This is in compliance with 
procurement laws, policies and regulations, especially E.O.120 on adopting countertrade 
in the procurement of foreign capital equipment. Countertrade projects for AFP 
modernization are considered and evaluated by the AFP-PITC Technical Working Group 
for their impact on the Philippine economy, long range national economic objectives, 
contribution to export and job generation environmental remediation (Marvel, 2001). The 
Philippines is still considered a developing country and it has set a very high priority for 
its economic development. This is the main reason why in all its importation of defense 
articles, which are considered big ticket items, it attempts to take advantage of the 
opportunity to use countertrade. 
In almost all of its procurement in 2000 to 2004 for the AFP Modernization 
Program, countertrade is included in the contracts. In December 2003, the AFP procured 
manpack communication equipment from the U.S. Company Harris with an associated 80 
percent offset and 20 percent counterpurchase. A pending contract with U.S. Cadillac 
Gage for the upgrading of the V-150 armored vehicle will also provide countertrade 
arrangements. Several procurement projects for defense articles for the AFP using DCS 
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are still pending, as the finalization of offset arrangements are still on-going (Venturanza, 
Personal Communication, May 3, 2004). The total value of countertrade projects from 
CY 1989 to CY 2000 derived from foreign procurement by various Philippine 
government agencies is US$300 million. Starting in 1999, U.S. economic and security 
assistance to the Philippines substantially increased. Summarized below is the actual 
amount of FMS supported by FMF credit funds to the Philippines from 1991 to 2003. 
 
FMS Supported by FMF credits 
In Millions of $ 
USER 1991 1992 1993 94-98 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
PA 32.50 4.48     0.50 4.80 4.63 
PAF 86.50 7.55     0.99 8.60 5.95 
PN 51.50 4.00     0.50 3.60 5.89 
PC 17.50         
GHQ 12.00 8.97 15.00  1.00 1.44    
TAFT        2.00 1.90 
CT        25.00 1.50 
TOTAL 200.00 25.00 15.00 0.00 1.00 1.44 1.99 44.00 19.87 
PA - Philippine Army 
PAF - Philippine Air Force 
PN – Philippine Navy 
PC – Philippine Constabulary 
GHQ – General Headquarters 
TAFT – Technical Assistance Field Team 
CT – Counterterrorism 
 
Table 4. Foreign Military Sales to the Philippines from 1991 to 2003. (From: 
“MGen Castellano’s Briefing Slides,” 2003) 
 
As indicated above, the Philippines is a regular recipient of the Foreign Military 
Financing credit funds from the United States. These funds were used by the Philippine 
government to finance the procurement of U.S. defense articles through Foreign Military 
Sales. The procurement of U.S. defense articles using funds from the Philippines treasury 
was comparatively lower than the FMF fund credit used to finance FMS transactions due 
to the Philippines’ lack of appropriated funds intended for the procurement of defense 
articles. An interview with Major Caranto, the Chief of International Logistics Branch 
under the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, OG4, PA, indicated that 
without U.S. FMF grants and credit used to finance FMS, procurement of U.S. defense  
articles by the Philippines would be greatly reduced.  This was corroborated by Ms 
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Nancy Mikles, the DSCA’s FMS Program Director for the Philippines, who said 
that Philippine government funds have never been used for FMS cases except for the 
funds intended for the refurbishment of 10 UH-1H helicopters in 2003 given as U.S. 
Excess Defense Articles. 
It can be observed that U.S. security assistance to the Philippines provided in the 
form of FMF credits and Economic Support Fund (ESF) is inducing the Philippine 
government to procure defense articles from the U.S. using government-to-government 
transactions or FMS. The FY 2005 budget request for security assistance to the 
Philippines, at $164 million, will again increase the amount of FMS to the Philippines. 
Just as in the previous three years, procurement through FMS would again increase as the 
United States extended FMF credits to the Philippines. 
5. Political Factors 
Political factors also influence procurement decision makers as to what and where 
to procure as well as what method of procurement to be used. A case that illustrates the 
influence of politics in arms transfer was when Malaysia was about to purchase MIG-29 
fighters from Russia. The Clinton administration intervened and convinced Malaysia to 
buy some F/A-18s from the United States as well. Likewise, when Greece was about to 
purchase electronic warfare equipment from Britain, the U.S. administration intervened 
to help secure a deal for Litton Industries instead (Haynes, 2001, p. 7).  
The renewed bilateral security relationship between the United States and the 
Philippines began in 1999, when President Estrada indicated his full support and approval 
for the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). VFA gives U.S. forces access to ports and 
training facilities in the Philippines. The manifestation of support given by Philippine 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to President Bush’s war on terror broadened and 
further improved this renewed RP—U.S. diplomatic and security relationship. The 
political relationship between the Philippines and the United States was further 
strengthened when President Bush designated the Philippines as a major non-NATO ally 
in 2003. By being a U.S Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), the Philippines would be 
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given greater access to American defense equipment and supplies (“Philippine American 
Ties”, 2004). The Philippines is benefiting from this strong political relationship. 
During the opening ceremony of the joint RP-US military exercises in the 
Philippines in March 2004, two months before the presidential election, President 
Arroyo, in her speech, said:  
I want to emphasize the blessings to our country of a strong relationship 
with the United States. This economic and security relationship with the 
United States that was forged during my administration is worth $6 
billion, including American investments. She further said These are the 
blessings of a good foreign policy made up of two friends who are tied up 
by mutual interest and not by a relationship of dependency. There is more 
to come because we have been declared by the US as a major non-NATO 
ally (Sy, 2004, p. 1).  
The amount of U.S security assistance given to a foreign country is dependent 
upon the existing political alliance between said foreign country and the United States at 
a certain time. The manifestation of support by President Bush to the administration of 
President Arroyo by designating the Philippines a MNNA may encourage the PGMA 
administration to procure more defense articles from the United States.  President Bush 
may also request that President Arroyo procure defense articles from the United States to 
strengthen and further enhance the security and political stability of the two countries.  
This situation occurred during the administration of President Marcos from 1965-
1986. When President Marcos openly expressed his support for and cooperation with 
United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia, he received in return substantial economic 
and security assistance for the Philippines. The security assistance to President Marcos 
was subsequently reduced due to allegations of corruption and human rights violations 
committed by the Armed Forces using U.S. provided military assistance.  
The political advantage of using FMS is the fact that this is a government to 
government sale of arms. In the book “Arms Transfer and Dependence,” author Christian 
Catrina quoted former President of Tanzania as saying: 
For the selling of arms is something which a country does only when it 
wants to support and strengthen the regime or the group to whom the sale 
is made. Whatever restrictions or limits are placed on that sale, the sale is 
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a declaration of support- an implied alliance of a kind. You do not sell 
arms without saying, in effect: ‘In the light of the receiving country’s 
known policies, friends, and enemies, we anticipate that, in the last resort, 
we will be on their side in the case of any conflict. (Originally in the Far 
Eastern Economic Review, January 1971; quoted in Landgren-Backstrom 
1980: 231) 
The expression of friendship and support by the United States to the 
administration of President Arroyo is an incentive for the AFP for sourcing U.S. defense 
articles through FMS. This will also reinforce existing RP-US bilateral security relations 
as documented by the Mutual Defense Treaty and Visiting Forces Agreement, 
substantiated by the series of RP-US joint training exercises in the Philippines. Indirectly, 
this will address the external security concerns of the Philippines, especially in the hotly 
contested sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands, specifically the Mischief Reef. 
The benefits derived by sourcing through a government-to-government or Foreign 
Military Sales cannot be achieved using Direct Commercial Sales even if the DCS is 
sourced from the United States. The political advantage of FMS cannot be equaled by 
DCS because FMS is backed by the U.S. government (“USA Rethinks Foreign Military 
Sales,” 14 October 1998, www.janes.com. Accessed March 15, 2004). 
The perception of corruption is another political factor to consider in choosing the 
method of procurement to be used in the acquisition of U.S. defense articles. Corruption 
is now closely watched in the AFP after mutinous soldiers on July 2003 claimed that one 
of their reasons for staging a coup d’état is the rampant corruption in the procurement 
activities of the AFP. Although the government and the AFP already have laws, policies 
and regulations, including the code of ethics to be followed in procurement, many 
corruption cases still exist. The investigation ordered by President Arroyo, conducted by 
the Office of the Ombudsman in CY 2003 regarding the allegations of graft and 
corruption in the procurement activities of the AFP ended with the filing of 195 
indictment cases due to noted irregularities in the procurement of goods and services for 
the Philippine Navy alone [Jane’s Defense Weekly, 2002]. The investigation conducted 
by the Feliciano Commission created by President Macapagal-Arroyo revealed that 




The procurement of defense articles using FMS will likely reduce corruption, or 
the perception of it, in the AFP, as procurement personnel are not involved in the 
acquisition process except in the generation of the requirements and preparation of LOR. 
As the U.S. DoD manages and administers FMS on a “no profit-no loss basis”, the 
suspicion of corruption in procurement might be eliminated. This rationale may induce 
the government to resort to FMS procurement to maintain the political stability of the 
current administration. 
6. Contract Administration 
Contracting activity in the AFP was not afforded that much importance when the 
United States still maintained its bases in the Philippines. Most of the AFP’s defense 
requirements were provided by the United States under the U.S. military assistance 
program. The AFP acquired its defense articles and services without undertaking 
acquisition and contracting activities associated with the purchase. U.S. defense articles 
provided through FMS limits the participation of the purchasing country to requirements 
generation and submission of the LOR.  
It was only after the termination of the U.S. Military Bases Agreement in 1991 
that the AFP started to professionalize its acquisition and contracting workforce.  
In a Master’s thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Commander Montanez 
concluded that the present AFP capability in contract administration is still inadequate. 
The AFP’s policies, rules and regulations on procurement were fragmented and subject to 
various interpretations. He stated, for instance, that Department Circular 1, which is the 
Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for the AFP Modernization Program, 
provides details on how to formulate contracts but does not give guidance on how to 
administer the contracts except for the preparation of the Program Status Report (PSR). 
He further stated that most of the laws, policies and regulations were focused on contract 
formation and not on contract administration, citing as an example EO 120, which 
governs countertrade arrangements, but did not touch on contract administration.  
The current procurement of defense articles for the AFP in line with its 
modernization program was further hindered by the issuance of Executive Orders 235 
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and 240. These two E.O.s are believed to have resulted from the response to the clamor 
created by mutinous soldiers for the present administration to address corruption in the 
procurement activities in the Department of National Defense. In compliance with E.O 
240, DND issued D.O. Number 205 which established a single AFP-BAC to handle 
acquisition and contracting jobs for the entire AFP below a P50 million threshold. 
Contracts with more than P50 million threshold will have to be approved and signed by 
the Secretary of National Defense (Trinidad, Personal Communication, 2004). 
Circumstances occurring in the present AFP Equipment Acquisition Process tend 
to indicate that problems remain that delay the process. For instance, the tendency of the 
BAC to grant requests to foreign bidders for an extension of the date for the submission 
of bids, citing the bidders’ failure to authenticate their eligibility documents, is clear 
evidence of a communications failure during the Invitation to Bid or pre-bid conference 
phase.  Although the new law RA 9184 provides for specific timelines for the submission 
of bids, it has not been fully implemented (Trinidad, Personal Communication, May 7, 
2004).  
Another reason for the delay in procurement is the irregular attendance both of 
members of the AFP-BAC and the DND-BAC during their scheduled meetings. BAC 
members are only performing secondary functions on the Committee and are pre-
occupied with their main jobs most of the time.  
7. Defense Factors 
The Philippines is still facing internal and external security problems. The AFP is 
still preoccupied containing the security threats posed by the local communist insurgents 
as well as the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group allegedly linked with the international terrorist 
movement Jemayah Islamiya. Meanwhile, sovereignty claims over the Mischief Reef and 
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in the South China Sea remain an external security threat 
for the Philippines. China, which is one of the six countries claiming these islands, has 
been seen as being aggressive in establishing structures in Mischief Reef claimed by the 
Philippines. The Philippines tries to link its security interest with regional defense, 
assuming that the United States would defend the Philippines in case China attempted to 
impose its will over Mischief Reef, as this is covered under the provision of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty of 1951 (Narcise, 2002).  
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The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 is an agreement between the United States 
and the Philippines to strengthen their collective defenses against external armed attack. 
Article II of the treaty says that “in order more effectively to achieve the objective of this 
treaty, the parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and 
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (“Mutual Defense 
Treaty,” 1951).  
Collective capacity to resist armed attack will be effectively attained only 
when there is commonality and interoperability of system, forces and 
equipment.  The U.S DoD is motivated to sell US weapons systems to 
allies through FMS and FMF because this will enhance commonality and 
interoperability which in the future will enhance coalition operations. 
(“The United States Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998,” 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf. Accessed March 3, 
2004).  
The present defense capabilities of the Philippines can be attributed largely to the 
security assistance provided by the United States to the Philippines since its 
independence in 1946. According to MGen Cicero Castillano, the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Logistics, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the majority of the AFP’s inventory of 
equipment and platforms was acquired from the United States. The U.S. also remains the 
traditional source of maintenance funds for this equipment sourced from the United 
States (Mgen Castillano, Personal Interview, December 9, 2003).  
Although some AFP weapons systems or components may be sourced  from the 
commercial marketplace using Direct Commercial Sales, there are items which may be 
available only using FMS. Certain defense articles, especially spare parts available for 
sale through FMS, are most suitable for certain existing weapons systems of the AFP. 
This facilitates commonality and interoperability of forces and weapons systems for 
effective coalition operations.   
C. SUMMARY 
The chapter discussed the acquisition process used in the Philippines, including 
the governing rules and laws. It also identified major factors that influenced or affected 
the selection of the method of procurement to be used by Philippine decision-makers in 
the procurement of defense articles from foreign countries. The AFP Equipment 
Acquisition Process, which may lead to the use of Direct Commercial Sales, and the FMS 
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acquisition process are the procedures used by the AFP to procure materials locally and 
abroad. Existing laws as well as the political and economic situation of the Philippines 
may further influence the decision to choose either one of these two procurement 
methods. 
The next chapter will present the advantages and disadvantages of FMS and DCS 
considering Philippines laws on procurement, processes and procedures, and the 




VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN FMS AND DCS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The Philippines has two methods by which it can procure defense articles from 
the United States, namely, DCS or FMS. The transfer of defense articles using these two 
methods needs the approval of the U.S. government through AECA and other statutes. 
The U.S. government has no preference as to the purchasing country’s preferred method 
of procurement (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003). The transfer of the defense articles 
for both methods has been designed to achieve the common result of fulfilling the 
security and political objectives of the Philippines and the United States. The two 
methods have specific features, and in the purchaser’s viewpoint, have corresponding 
advantages and disadvantages.  
The characteristics of the two systems that reflect their advantages and 
disadvantages are discussed here to assist Philippine decision makers in their selection of 
the best method to acquire U.S. defense articles. However, special circumstances 
prevailing in the Philippines influence the decision for selecting the best method for 
procuring the needed U.S. defense articles.  
B. ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Financing 
The government of the Philippines may use either of two methods to pay for 
defense articles procured from the United States, i.e., Philippine national funds or U.S. 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants/credits fund. FMF grant/credit funds are 
appropriated to provide financial support to eligible allied countries desiring to buy U.S. 
defense articles who do not have the needed cash for immediate payment. The 
Philippines is eligible to use such funds. The FMF fund is primarily used to finance 
Foreign Military Sales. Direct Commercial Sales may be funded by the FMF credit fund 
as well, but only in very rare cases. According to the DSCA Country Program Director, 
the Philippines has never been allowed to use the FMF credit fund to finance DCS. 
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AFP Comptroller Letter 82-9, dated 6 December 1982, allows the payment of the 
required initial deposit for FMS with funds from the AFP appropriations. For FMS cases, 
payments are made before the delivery of the defense articles. A signed LOA is not 
considered to be a binding contract without the required initial deposit from the 
Philippines. This initial deposit will be sent via wire transfer and held in an FMS trust 
fund at DFAS/DE, managed by DSCA. A cross leveling agreement allows the funds 
deposited by the Philippines in the FMS trust fund to be moved to and from a special 
holding account, or moved between separate FMS cases, thereby maximizing the use of 
the country’s funds (DISAM Online Green Book, 2003).  
In a Direct Commercial contract, items are delivered to the Philippines prior to 
payment. Terms of payment may be either in full cash payment, partial payment or 
installments, depending on the negotiated agreement. 
FMF grant/credit provides an incentive for the Philippines to procure through 
FMS. By using the U.S. provided FMF grant/credit fund, the Philippines can save its own 
cash for later use for higher priority needs and avoid the sudden economic impact of 
costly purchases of U.S. defense articles.  
2. Pricing 
Price comparison between FMS and DCS remains a controversial issue. The U.S. 
government, as well as U.S. contractors, discouraged buyers from comparing the prices 
for the two methods of procurement. However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is 
important to present both sides of this issue.  
The price indicated in the LOA is the best estimate of the cost to be incurred in an 
FMS transaction. The final or actual price for the defense articles being procured may be 
higher or lower than the estimated price in the LOA. The buyer country will have to pay 
the actual price, that is, the base price plus the authorized surcharges, whether the actual 
price is higher or lower than the LOA price. The price for an FMS case may become 
higher by as much as 25 percent compared to Direct Commercial Sales because of the 
application of investment and operational costs to the base price of the item.  
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The U.S. DoD is authorized by AECA to recover all costs incurred in the 
implementation and execution of a FMS case, which is in line with the U.S. government 
policy of the “no loss-no profit” basis for administering FMS cases. The base price for 
FMS items decreases when the ordered item is combined with DoD’s own requirement. 
This reduction results from the increased quantity of the items ordered from the 
contractor(s), thus attaining economies of scale. 
The FMS price may also be affected by inflation because of the longer processing 
time in a FMS case. This situation will create another problem for the AFP, which 
depends on an annual program budget fixed by Congress except when the funding is for a 
multi-year procurement project approved by Congress. 
Prices for DCS are influenced by the interplay of market forces. Unless the item is 
manufactured by only one source, competition will drive the prices of items down. A 
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract is the typical contract used in Direct Commercial Sales. 
FFP is characterized by a negotiated fixed price, a negotiated delivery schedule, and 
usually include penalties for the contractor’s failure to comply with the terms of the 
contract. Although this type of contract is riskier for the contractor, it may offer the 
contractor greater profits. 
U.S. companies claimed that DCS price is lower because there is no “authorized 
charges” as is present in FMS cases. U.S. government officials indicated that the price 
quoted by DCS is cheaper because it does not include follow-on support and training. 
Furthermore, DCS can make higher profits through the sale of defense articles while 
under a FMS purchase, U.S. law and regulations may fix the percentage profit. 
Price is a major consideration in the acquisition of defense articles by the 
Philippine government, as can be gleaned from the emphasis on the use of competitive 
bidding in the procurement process of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 
3. Flexibility in Contracting and Offsets 
As offsets are used by buyer countries to enhance their economic and political 
interest, the United States and other foreign suppliers will have to accept it as an element 
of international market competition. The Philippines, as a buyer of U.S. defense articles, 
is no exception, as its laws, policies and regulations mandate the application of offsets in 
64 
the foreign procurement of capital equipment, machineries and other supplies. U.S. 
contractors have to compete with other foreign suppliers trying to win contracts with the 
Philippine government. Although offsets are not completely prohibited in FMS cases, the 
United States maintains a hands-off policy with respect to offset arrangements by 
allowing the concerned U.S. contractor and the Philippines to make the offset deal 
separately from the FMS case. In effect, the Philippines will be dealing with two 
contracts when it wants to arrange an offset with the contractor involved in an FMS case, 
one for the LOA and another for the offset contract with the private contractor. This 
process takes time to negotiate and may result in disconnects between the FMS contract 
and the offset arrangement. An interview with Ms. Mickles of DSCA reveals that the 
Philippines has never used offsets in Foreign Military Sales. 
An offset is a major consideration in the selection of the method of procurement 
in the Philippines. It forms part of the eligibility requirements of bidders. It is easier for 
the Philippines to negotiate an offset arrangement under a DCS contract because it can 
deal directly with the U.S. contractor.  
Aside from an offset, DCS may provide greater flexibility in contracting such as 
obtaining special warranty and tailoring special equipment to the particular needs of the 
AFP.  
4. Buyer’s Capability to Negotiate a Direct Contract 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines has been dependent on the United States for 
the development and upgrades of its defense capabilities by acquiring U.S. defense 
articles through FMS. This has meant that there was less involvement of AFP personnel 
in acquisition and contracting of U.S. defense articles for the AFP. As such, AFP 
contracting personnel still lack the needed skills and experience to handle Direct 
Commercial Sales contracts, especially when it involves a complex weapons system.  
Under the FMS system, DoD will conduct the contract administration in lieu of 
the AFP and is responsible for choosing the most qualified source, obtaining the best 
quality and fair price, as well as the timely delivery of the items to be purchased. Often, 
FMS and DoD orders are consolidated to obtain economic order quantity, thereby 
decreasing the item’s unit price.     
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5. Buyer’s Desire for U.S. Military Personnel Involvement 
The involvement of U.S. military personnel in the military affairs of the AFP has 
its legal basis in the agreements and treaties signed by the two countries since Philippine 
independence in 1946. The Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) of 1947 paved the 
way for the creation of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), a 
contingent of U.S. military advisers permanently deployed in the Philippines, whose 
work focuses on facilitating the logistical and training requirements of the Philippines 
Armed Forces.  JUSMAG personnel are still employed by the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines in purchasing needed U.S. defense articles using FMS. For example, the RP-
US Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) reviewed and endorsed a comprehensive security 
assessment to assist the government of the Philippines in developing a defense program 
that will improve the ability of the AFP to address its existing security threats (“Joint 
Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines,” 
2003).  
The Armed Forces of the Philippines has benefited from its close working 
relationship with JUSMAG personnel since the early days of independence to the present. 
For example, as cited by the Chief of the Interlog branch of the Philippine Air Force’s 
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for logistics, A4, most of the major defense 
equipment recently acquired by the Philippines from the United States is Excess Defense 
Articles sold through FMS. The recent procurement by the Philippine Air Force of the 
eight UH-1H helicopters (FMS Case PI-B-IAG) were Excess Defense Articles sold 
through FMS by the USG. These items were sold on an “as is, where is” basis, with no 
guarantee of either initial or follow-on support. However, JUSMAG personnel are not 
recommending procurement by the AFP of defense articles which cannot be sustained for 
future operations (Musico, Personal Communication, May 22, 2004).  
Outside the FMS process, where the AFP may pursue efforts at purchasing Major 
Defense Equipment (MDE) using DCS, JUSMAG-Philippines personnel may also appear 
by aiding both parties in securing the required third-party transfer approval from the U.S. 
State Department. Without approval from the U.S. State Department, no such transfer of 
any U.S. (MDE) can ever take place, even if the parties involved are both allied with the 
U.S. government (Musico, Personal Communication, May 24, 2004). 
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6. Logistics and Training 
One of the most important factors considered by the AFP in the procurement of 
defense articles is the availability of initial and follow-on support for the articles 
procured. The Total Package Approach (TPA) associated with FMS will make this 
possible. In the case of 19 OV-10A aircraft procured by the Philippines in 1992 (FMS 
Case PI-D-SBD), the Philippine government was informed of the availability of the TPA 
for the weapon system. The Philippine government accepted the TPA because there was 
no existing infrastructure at that time to support the operation and maintenance for this 
new weapon system. Included in the system’s acquisition are the following: 
• Purchase of initial spares support for one year   
• Acquisition of all other necessary accessories such as test equipment, 
special tools, technical manuals and aerospace ground equipment (AGE) 
that established the initial support infrastructure 
• Purchase of air munitions such as rockets, launchers, guns, and bombs that 
provided the OV-10A weaponry to support air strike missions 
• Follow-on purchase of concurrent spare parts that provided the basic in-
country supply system 
• Transition training of pilots in the operation of the OV-10A 
• Development of a maintenance capability by way of providing training 
and technical support equipment to PAF maintenance technicians at the 
organizational and intermediate levels (Musico, Personal Communication, 
May 5, 2004) 
All provisions (spares, manuals, support equipment, training, technical reps, etc.,) 
necessary to allow the immediate deployment of the OV-10A aircraft to perform combat 
missions in the field as soon as they are delivered are included in the weapon system buy-
out and indicated line by line in the LOA. Flight training of four Philippine Air Force 
pilots in the OV-10A was conducted in CONUS, while training for the PAF maintenance 
personnel for the aircraft was done in the Philippines by U.S. OV-10A technicians 
(Musico, Personal Communication, May 5, 2004). 
FMS may be the best method of procurement by the Philippines for the OV-10A, 
since the U.S. Armed Forces uses this weapon system. The Philippines may be able to 
capitalize on U.S. experience and existing U.S. government logistics inventories. Under a 
Cooperative Logistic Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA), most of the DoD inventory 
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and contracting system can be drawn upon to support the requirements for the spare parts 
of the OV-10A by the Philippine government. The DoD logistics system, in effect, serves 
as a procurement staff for the Philippines by procuring its required individual items from 
the current U.S. sources.  
There are also some U.S. contractors who could provide full logistics support for 
the defense articles which they sell. If they are capable of furnishing the full logistics 
support, the results can be expected to be as stated in their contracts. 
7. Procurement Lead Time/Delivery Schedule 
In the Master’s thesis of Steven J. Colcombe, he quoted CDR Michael R. Pease, 
USN Office of Defense Cooperation, United States Embassy Rome as saying: 
DCS is much more responsive than FMS, and incentives are much better 
aligned to support the end user. It is not the 2.5% FMS admin fee that 
countries object to, it is that dealing with FMS adds a huge layer of red 
tape, delays and risks. 
The same situation is happening in the Philippines in the case of the procurement 
of eight UH-1H helicopters from the United States through Excess Defense Articles. The 
contract was signed in 2002, but the helicopters were received in 2004.  
The marked advantage of DCS over FMS is the delivery schedule. For defense 
articles already in production, delivery is faster through DCS than through FMS. 
Contractors under DCS are bound to follow the negotiated fixed delivery schedule 
stipulated in the contract or face a penalty for failure to do so. On the other hand, once the 
delivery schedule has been fixed under DCS, and an emergency situation arises, the 
Philippine government cannot simply change the negotiated fixed delivery schedule to 
meet its needs. Under FMS, DoD can remedy the situation if the items needed by the 
Philippines are available in the DoD stock or under current production for DoD 
procurements. DoD may divert these items under production to the Philippines or ship the 
items available in the DoD inventory to meet the emergency needs of the Philippines. 
Causes for delays in FMS include the time for the development, review and 
acceptance of the LOA, and then consolidating these requirements for the next 
purchasing cycle, followed by the contract negotiation by DoD contracting personnel and 
U.S. contractor(s).  
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C.  SUMMARY 
FMS and DCS differ in style and substance, but also have some similarities. Sales 
or the transfer of defense articles using these two methods of procurement need the 
approval of the U.S. government and are governed by the AECA. Both are also designed 
to achieve the common result of an arms transfer that will enhance the security and 
political objectives of the Philippines and the United States.  
Issues have been analyzed and differences between the two approaches have been 
identified. The Philippines places great weight on price, delivery schedule, offsets and 
logistics and training. DCS appeared to be more responsive for the first three 
considerations, while FMS promises the better choice when buying a complex weapon 
system used by the U.S. military. Procurement through FMS also enhances 
standardization and interoperability of the AFP and the US armed forces. 
When the Philippines contemplates buying a complex weapons systems via a 
Total Package Approach, it is wise to buy using FMS, as it offers complete infrastructure 
and logistics support for the item(s). However, at the present time most of Philippine 
procurement only involves spare parts and other support system already in use in the 
Philippines, TPA is not used frequently.   
Procurement method advantages and disadvantages may be difficult to assess, 
especially when there is a lack of knowledge and biased evaluations of the relative merits 
of each system. The potential advantages for each of the two procurement systems, as 
well as the common misperception of FMS and DCS are summarized in Appendix A. 
However, the decision for selecting the best method to use in procuring the 
needed U.S. defense articles will be influenced by the economic and political 
circumstances prevailing in the Philippines at that particular time.  
The next chapter will present the Researcher’s conclusions, recommendations, 
and answers to the research questions.  
 
69 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this thesis was to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of FMS 
and DCS and determine the most advantageous method of procurement to use in the 
procurement of U.S. defense articles needed for the modernization of the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines. The thesis traced the evolution of U.S. security assistance policies as 
well as the history of U.S. security assistance to the Philippines. The research conducted 
for this thesis indicates that there are many factors decision-makers in the Philippines and 
other concerned government agencies to consider in choosing the method of procurement 
to be used in the acquisition of U.S. defense articles. These factors were analyzed in 
conjunction with current U.S. laws, policies, and methodologies governing FMS and 
DCS. Based on the analysis and interpretation of the data gathered as well as the author’s 
personal observations, conclusions and recommendations are provided. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Foreign Military Sales is characterized by bureaucratic red tape, making the 
processes and procedures lengthy, resulting in delayed delivery of the items bought and 
possible price changes due to inflation. Thus, foreign buyers have shifted to DCS, as it 
provides faster delivery, fixed prices and warranties, easier arrangements for offsets, and 
greater flexibility to tailor requirements to the customer’s needs.  
FMS procurement of items used by the U.S. Armed Forces enables the purchasing 
country to benefit from quality follow-on logistics support and training. Buying through 
FMS also promotes standardization and enhances interoperability for mutual defense and 
coalition operations. The apparent lack of skills and experience by acquisition and 
contracting personnel in the Philippines warrants the current use of FMS to obtain the 
best value defense articles from the United States. 
The Philippine government gives high priority to an item’s price, delivery 
schedule and the application of offsets in the contract. On those points, DCS has proven 
to be more responsive than FMS.  
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The selection of the method of procurement will be influenced by the economic 
and political situation prevailing in the Philippines at a particular time. As a developing 
country, the Philippines still needs security assistance from the United States to be able to 
effectively address its current internal and external threats. Eligibility for Excess Defense 
Articles, Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Financing fund are 
incentives for the Philippine government to procure items through FMS. Procurement 
through FMS will enhance interoperability and promote the existing defense and security 
relationship between the Philippines and the United States.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The U.S. government should improve the FMS system so that it is more 
businesslike, including the application of countertrade. It is necessary to institute reforms 
to streamline the FMS process to elicit better responses to the needs of the customers, i.e., 
obtaining the items at the right price, at the right time and can best address the purchasing 
country’s defense requirements.  
The Philippines should use FMS in procuring items in use by the U.S. Armed 
Forces, as it promises better follow-on logistics support and offers opportunities for 
training. It will also improve interoperability and enhance the security agreements 
between the Philippines and the United States. 
On the other hand, DCS promises better price, timely/early delivery and the 
potential for offsets, which are the main issues of the Philippines in its procurement 
policy. The Philippines should not only consider the economic side of the procurement 
but also consider the political and security implications of the purchase. The purchase of 
U.S. defense articles should strike a balance between economic and security/defense 
considerations. 
D. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the most advantageous method of procurement to be used by the 
Philippine government in the acquisition of defense articles from the United States for 
use by the Armed Forces of the Philippines? 
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Generally, it may not be possible to do a direct comparison between FMS and 
DCS. There are important differences affecting prices, quality, schedule, direct buyer 
involvement, training and follow-on logistical support, application of offsets, and other 
factors when using FMS and DCS.  
The strongest argument in favor of DCS will come from the existing Philippine 
laws on procurement which requires the use of competitive public bidding with the goal 
of obtaining the lowest price possible, a streamlined procurement process to achieve an 
earlier delivery schedule, and accompanying countertrade in all contracts for foreign 
procurements. A DCS contract is more responsive to all of these issues. 
On the other hand, the Philippines still lacks the financial capability to support its 
defense modernization program needs fully. Security assistance from the United States 
which may be made available through FMS induced the Philippine government to 
procure through FMS, although sometimes at a higher cost and delayed delivery. An 
application for countertrade under FMS contracts is also more difficult to obtain than in 
DCS, resulting in an immense disincentive to the Philippine decision-makers to opt for 
FMS.  
It must be recognized by Philippine decision-makers that it is not only the 
economy of the country at stake in the procurement of defense articles. Consideration for 
the politico-military situation of the country vis-à-vis the United States should be taken 
into account when buying U.S. defense articles. As previously discussed, buying through 
FMS has political advantages over DCS.  
It is, therefore, up to the Philippine decision-makers to determine the relative 
weights of these factors considering the prevailing economic, political and security 
situation of the Philippines at a particular time.   
 
2. First Subsidiary Question 
• What is Foreign Military Sales and how does it operate as model of 
procurement by the Philippine government?  
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a component of the United States Security 
Assistance Program authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). It provides for 
the transfer of defense articles and/or defense services, including training, to eligible 
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foreign purchasers. It is a government-to-government sale of U.S. defense articles and 
services, usually from Department of Defense (DoD) stocks or through new procurement 
under DoD-managed contracts (DoD 5105.38-M, 2003). 
FMS is operated and managed by DoD through DSCA on a “no profit-no loss” 
basis, thus the purchasing country will have to pay for costs incurred by DoD in 
completing the sale transactions. The FMS process basically consists of seven phases. 
These are the project definition phase, wherein the requirements and specific needs of the 
purchaser are determined; the request phase, wherein the Letter of Request (LOR) is 
prepared by the purchaser country, sent to the United States, reviewed by the State 
Department and validated by MILDEP; the offer phase, wherein the LOA is prepared, 
reviewed and forwarded to the purchaser country; the acceptance phase, wherein the 
purchaser country reviews the LOA, signs it and sends it back to the Implementing 
Agency (IA) in the United States; the implementation phase, wherein deposits are 
received by the DFAS and FMS directives are issued; the execution phase, during which 
the item is delivered to the customer; and finally, case closure when DFAS bills the 
customer, reconciles the records, and the MILDEP closes the case. Payment for FMS 
may come from Philippine national funds and/or from U. S. provided Foreign Military 
Financing. 
3. Second Subsidiary Question 
• What is Direct Commercial Sales and how does it operate as a model of 
procurement by the Philippine government? 
A Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) is a sale made by a U.S. defense contractor 
directly to a foreign buyer without U.S. government intervention except for the licensing 
of the export sale in accordance with the AECA. Under DCS, the purchaser country has  
more direct involvement during contract negotiation, allows firm fixed pricing, fixed 
delivery, warranty and penalty for violation(s) of provisions of the contract. (DISAM 
Online Green Book, 2003).  
4. Third Subsidiary Question 
• What are the pertinent laws, rules and regulations, and policies that govern 
Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales when used by the 
Philippine government in its procurement activities? 
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Before a sale of U.S. defense articles to a foreign country, whether through FMS 
or DCS, the country must be considered eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles. 
Eligibility is affirmed by a Presidential Determination documented by the President’s 
written memorandum to the Secretary of State. AECA governs the purchase of U.S. 
defense articles through either FMS or DCS. 
The Philippine government, on the other hand, has existing laws that govern both 
FMS and DCS as discussed in Chapter IV. The most significant and most common 
provision in these laws, policies and regulations governing foreign procurement is the 
requirement for countertrade. For instance, E.O 120 issued on August 19, 1993, directs 
the national government, its departments, bureaus, agencies and offices, including 
government-owned and controlled corporations, to adopt countertrade as a supplemental 
trade tool with respect to the importation or procurement of foreign capital equipment, 
machinery, products, goods and services.  
5. Fourth Subsidiary Question 
• How do defense articles procured through FMS or DCS affect the 
operational effectiveness and efficiency of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines? 
The majority of the Philippine defense equipment, including logistical support, 
was sourced from the United States through FMS and DCS, but mostly with FMS. Some 
items are only authorized to be sold through FMS due to security considerations. 
Procurement through FMS promotes commonality, standardization and interoperability 
with the U.S. forces, as well as enhancing a closer security relationship between the 
Philippines and the United States. 
The benefits derived by sourcing through a government-to-government or Foreign 
Military Sales cannot be achieved using Direct Commercial Sales even if DCS is sourced 
from the United States. The political advantage of FMS cannot be equaled by that of DCS 
because the U.S. government backs FMS. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following are some suggested areas for further research related to the thesis: 
• To study the possibility of privatizing the administration and management 
of FMS. 
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• To study the effect of countertrade on FMS to both the buyer and the 
seller. 













APPENDIX.  POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF FMS AND DCS 
A. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
 
Potential Advantages Considerations 
1. Total package approach based 
on U.S. military experience. 
1. Purchaser must decide whether the total 
package may exceed his needs or financial 
capabilities. 
2. U.S. government uses its own 
procurement procedures and 
acts as procurement agent for 
foreign countries. 
2. Sophisticated foreign purchasing staff may 
(or may not) be able to achieve better overall 
deal by negotiating directly with contractor.  
3. Proven and established 
logistics support for items 
common to DoD. 
3. It occasionally is possible to achieve a full 
range of contractor logistics support. 
4. Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR), economic 
order quantity buys, use of 
Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE) or 
Government Furnished 
Materials (GFM), and 
competitive procurements 
tend to reduce price. 
4. Compliance with DoD procedures also tends 
to increase lead times, thus emphasizing 
need for country planning to start 
procurement process earlier. 
5. Facilitates establishment of 
design configuration and 
enhances potential for 
standardization. 
5. Purchaser must decide on the degree of 
standardization required for a particular 
purchase. 
6. Purchaser pays only the actual 
cost to DoD (including 
management expenses), with 
profits controlled by FAR. 
6. While initial LOA estimates tend, in the 
aggregate, to be considerably higher than 
final LOA costs, final costs fluctuate (both 
up and down), making purchaser funds 
management more difficult. 
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7. Cross-leveling in the FMS 
Trust Fund can maximize use 
of country funds. 
7. Firm fixed priced contracts and fixed 
payment schedules can be obtained under 
direct commercial contracts. 
8. Quality control to assure item 
meets MILSPECs is done by 
U.S. government personnel. 
 
8. This service can be purchased under FMS 
for certain commercial contracts 
9. Items may be available from 
DoD stocks in times of 
emergency. 
9. Availability is significantly dependent on 




involvement of DoD 
personnel in military planning, 
deployment concepts, 
operational planning, etc. 
10. If closer military-to-military relationships 
are a purchaser objective, FMS provides one 
avenue toward achieving them. 
11. Better access to training at 
U.S. military schools. 
11. Purchaser can procure hardware under 
commercial contract, and generally obtain 
associated training at U.S. military schools 
via FMS. 
12. Purchase of end item facilities 
maintenance of design 
configuration, provision of 
technical data, modifications, 
and catalog information. 
12. Arrangements for continual configuration 
commonality with DoD are an integral 
objective of the FMS system. 
13. FMS customers can use ILCS 
system. 
13. Commercial customers must rely on the 
commercial telecommunications system. 
B. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES 
Potential Advantages Considerations 
1. Potential for fixed delivery or 
fixed price, with penalty if 
contractor fails. 
1. Requires considerable experience and 
sophistication by country negotiators. 
2. Business-to-business 
relationship allows country to 
negotiate cost and contract 
terms. 
2. Closer military-to-military relationships are 
a purchaser’s objective; FMS provides an 
avenue to achieve this objective. 
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Potential Advantages Considerations 
3. Direct negotiations with 
contractor can result in a 
quicker response. 
3. Requires considerable experience and 
sophistication by country negotiators. 
4. Sometimes the only source of 
logistics support for items not 
included in U.S. inventory. 
 
4. Purchaser must decide upon desired degree 
of standardization with U.S. forces. 
5. More capability to tailor 
package to unique country 
needs. 
5. Tailored” package may detract from 
standardization desires. 
6. Continuity of personal 
contacts with contractor 
technical personnel. 
6. Generally, also can be arranged via FMS. 
7. New equipment directly from 
production line. 
7. Generally, also can be arranged via FMS, 
although some spares may come from DoD 
inventories. 
8. Lower prices possible under 
certain circumstances. 
8. Significantly dependent on item or service 
involved and sophistication of country 
negotiators. 
9. Generally fixed payment 
schedule which eases 
budgeting problems. 
9. Preponderance of payment schedules is more 
“front-loaded” than under FMS. 
10. Purchaser can include offset 
provisions in one contract. 
10. Purchaser can negotiate offsets (directly with 
contractor) and still procure under FMS. 
11. FMS administrative surcharge 
and DoD management costs 
can be avoided. 
11. Purchaser must consider entire cost of 
transaction, including his contracting staff 
costs and possibly increased contractor 
administrative costs. 
12. Commercial purchase of some 
types of items could help to 
create and develop a 
procurement capability. 
12. Scarcity of resources and time may not allow 
for this type of on-job training for 
procurement staffs. 
C. COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS OF FMS OR COMMERCIAL SALES 
Misperceptions Facts 
1. FMS prices are cheaper. 1. Depends on item being purchased, 
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Misperceptions Facts 
negotiating skills, and many other variables. 
2. Commercial prices are 
cheaper 
2. Depends on item being purchased, 
negotiating skills, and may other variables. 
3. FMS offers better assurance 
for approval of transfer of 
technology. 
 
3. Technology release considerations are 
identical for FMS and commercial sales. 
4. Commercial sales offer a 
better assurance for approval 
of transfer of technology. 
4. Technology release considerations are 
identical for FMS and commercial sales. 
5. FMS is unreliable during 
hostilities involving either the 
user or the U.S. government. 
5. Foreign policy or DoD military priority 
decisions affect the flow of supplies to a 
country and can be expected to relate to the 
resource involved. FMS orders may still be 
filled depending on the nature of the 
hostilities. 
6. Commercial sales are 
unreliable during hostilities 
involving either the user or 
the U.S. government. 
6. Foreign policy or DoD military priority 
decisions affect the flow of supplies to a 
country and can be expected to relate to the 
resource involved. There may be a tendency 
to fill FMS orders first, depending on the 
nature of the hostilities. 
7. FMS provides slow or slack 
delivery schedule, with 
frequent slippages. 
7. The numerous built-in FMS system 
safeguards do slow the procurement process 
sometimes, although there seldom are 
slippages once delivery schedules are 
established. However, in a contingency 
situation where a USG decision is made to 
divert items from service stocks and expedite 
delivery, service is exemplary. 
8. Nonrecurring cost (NRC) 
recoupment charges for Major 
Defense Equipment is always 
accessed on FMS sales. 
8. Nonrecurring cost (NRC) recoupment 
waivers may be authorized for FMS on a 
case-by-case basis. Recent history indicates a 
high probability of waiver approval. 
9. A country cannot have an 
offset arrangement when they 
have an FMS case. 
9. A country may leave an offset arrangement in 
an FMS agreement, but the U.S. government 
will not be the enforcer of offset 




11. FMS system is characterized 
by a lack of continuity of 
personnel contact due to 
military personnel rotations. 
11. While this may be true for some cases, there 
are many DoD civilians who do not rotate. 
Also, military tour is normally three to four 
years about equal to commercial executive 
transfer patterns. 
 
12. No offset arrangements or 
coproduction programs are 
possible under FMS. 
12. Not true. These are common to many FMS 
LOAs. However, offsets must be negotiated 
separately by the purchaser with the 
contractor. 
13. Only FMS required U.S. 
government approval and 
congressional notification 
(AECA, Section 36(b), if 
necessary. 
13. All items meeting AECA notification 
thresholds require notification under both 
sales systems. AECA, Section 36(c) applies 
to commercial sale notifications to Congress.  
14. U.S. government reserves the 
right to terminate an FMS 
sale in the U.S. national 
interest. 
14. Applies equally to both FMS and commercial 
sales systems. 
15. Quality control is not assured 
for items bought 
commercially. 
15. Contractor sales depend on product 
reputation. Also, USG quality control 
procedures may be purchased for standard 
items. 
16. Contractor involvement stops 
once an end item is sold. 
16. Contractor participation in follow-on support 
and maintenance programs is common under 
either commercial or FMS. 
17. U.S. government controls 
third country sales only for 
items sold under FMS. 
17. Criteria and policy are the same for items 
purchased through either commercial or 
FMS. 
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